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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is concerned with the identification and analysis of the policy objectives of 
US antitrust and EU competition law, with particular reference to the hardcore vertical 
restrictions, absolute territorial protection (ATP) and minimum resale price maintenance 
(RPM). It does not critique the identified policy objectives as such, but it does critique 
the underlying economic principles through which they are interpreted to assess whether 
the US and EU legal positions on the hardcore restrictions are logically justifiable. 
As such, two chapters are dedicated to the identification of the objectives of US antitrust 
policy and EU competition policy, respectively. This is done through analysis of their 
legal development, and political and historical context. They conclude that the 
promotion of consumer welfare has become the sole objective of US antitrust policy, but 
that EU competition policy has retained a multifaceted set of objectives, including the 
protection of market integration and the promotion of effective competition, as well as 
the welfare objectives the EU has adopted more recently. 
The final chapter assesses whether the US and EU legal positions on the hardcore 
vertical restrictions are logically justified by the policy objectives of each jurisdiction 
identified in the previous chapters. It considers the development of the legal positions in 
detail, and goes on to critique the economic analysis of vertical restraints under which 
the restrictions have been considered. It concludes that the EU justifies its absolute 
prohibition of both hardcore restrictions under its multifaceted set of competition policy 
objectives, but that the US can only logically justify its rule of reason for ATP under the 
sole objective of consumer welfare, while minimum RPM should have continued to be 
subject to per se illegality. The Leegin decision to permit minimum RPM subject to a 
rule of reason relied on flawed analysis of its economic effects. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able 
to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of 
the law – what are its goals? Everything else follows from 
the answer we give.’1 
 
1.1.Introductory Remarks  
It feels almost obligatory to open this thesis with the above quotation from Robert 
Bork’s hugely influential The Antitrust Paradox. The sentiment is undoubtedly 
universally shared by all concerned with the study and application of competition law 
and policy. Antitrust is at an apex in the interplay between law, policy, and economics; 
defined as much by legal dicta and complex economic analysis as by the fundamental 
political question of to what extent government and the law should regulate private 
action. As such, to say that there is a lack of consensus on the given answers to the 
question Bork posed would be an understatement.  
 
This thesis is concerned not with what those goals should be, but rather how the United 
States and the European Union have arrived at their present goals. As such, the first and 
second Chapters are, respectively, critiques of the legal history of US antitrust and EU 
competition law. Given the breadth of the academic debate in the United States, the first 
chapter starts by considering the schools of thought on antitrust policy in the abstract 
before assessing the historical development in Sherman Act case law. Its relatively brief 
treatment of the historical origins of the Sherman Act contrasts with the more extensive 
historical analysis of the factors leading to the development of European competition 
                                                          
1 R.H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox (2nd ed. Free Press, New York, 1993) 51 
2 
 
policy discussed in the second chapter. This is because European competition policy has 
been more shaped by evolution of policy by executive actors in the Commission than by 
any changes in the largely consistent interpretation of case law on competition law 
objectives by the Court of Justice. In the United States, changes in antitrust policy 
objectives are evidenced by shifts in the dynamic interpretation of Sherman Act case 
law. 
 
The third chapter focuses onto the hardcore restrictions: Absolute Territorial Protection 
(ATP), the most restrictive vertical nonprice restraint, and Minimum Resale Price 
Maintenance, the most restrictive vertical price restraint. The third chapter assesses the 
two jurisdictions’ legal position on the hardcore restrictions, concluding whether the 
positions are logically justified considering their policy objectives. It is necessary to 
draw some distinctions in how these are analysed. The policy objectives identified in the 
first and second chapters are not critiqued in the third, but the economic principles 
through which they have been interpreted are. The legal positions reached are also 
critiqued, which ultimately answers the thesis’ principal research question – are the 
present legal positions logically justified under the policy objectives they serve? 
  
1.2. Methodology 
This thesis has relied on primary and secondary literary sources, and has not 
incorporated any empirical research. Primary sources were principally in the form of 
case law, but also included European Union legislation and Commission publications, 
and a limited amount of United States legislation. These were obtained from Westlaw 
International, in the case of US primary sources, and the EU’s principal databases, Curia 
and Eur-Lex. Secondary sources included a mix of historical, economic and legal texts 
3 
 
and journal articles. The journal articles were sourced from a variety of databases, 
principally Hein Online. 
 
The research objectives have altered significantly from the initial research proposal. That 
proposal envisaged an inquiry into multi-jurisdictional corporate legal and compliance 
practice, in the context of a wider range of opposing antitrust issues. It became apparent 
that providing a meaningful answer to any research question on such a topic would 
require significant empirical study, and an early decision was taken to refocus the thesis 
onto a ‘black letter law’ research model. This subsequently evolved into an analysis of 
the US and EU legal positions in the context of their economic and historical 
backgrounds. 
 
The research metric that has survived from the original proposal is logical justification; 
whether the jurisdictions’ legal positions are logically justified under their policy 
objectives. It became clear that, given the wealth of primary and secondary material 
available, specific focus was required, and the hardcore vertical restrictions were an 
obvious choice. While the thesis has no requirement for an originality declaration and 
does not presume to claim it, it is hoped that this analysis of the hardcore vertical 
restrictions in the context of their wider historical and economic background provides an 
interesting perspective on this contentious area of competition law. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ORIGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF UNITED STATES 
ANTITRUST LAW 
2.1. Introduction 
The United States federal courts have never produced any ‘definitive statement’ of the 
objectives of US antitrust law.1 The vigorous academic debate advocating a variety of 
‘conflicting perceived goals’2 is rooted in the interpretation of the Sherman Act, which 
has changed radically over time. Despite subsequent legislation, §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 remain the principal statutory provisions under which 
antitrust cases are determined. It is a vague and expansive statute, and its Congressional 
intention is a disputed field for advocates of a variety of policy objectives.3 
 
This Chapter will begin with an assessment of the political background to drafting the 
Sherman Act. It will then consider the leading schools of thought on US antitrust policy, 
and what policy objectives they advocate. It will consider whether the Sherman Act was 
drafted with specific policy objectives engrained in it, or whether, as Frank Easterbrook 
suggests,4 it was deliberately drafted as a dynamic statute which gives the courts a ‘blank 
check’ to set the policy objectives of US antitrust. 
 
The following section, focusing on the development of US antitrust case law, will begin 
with discussion of the early cases interpreting the Sherman Act. On that foundation, it 
will critique the radical changes in antitrust law from the ‘equity objectives’5 which 
                                                          
1 R.H. Bork ‘Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act’ (1966) 9 Journal of Law and Economics 7  
2 E. Buttgieg Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest, A Comparative Analysis of US Antitrust 
Law and EC Competition Law (1st ed. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2009) 17 
3 H. Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (3rd ed. West, St. Paul, 
2005) 49 
4 F.H. Easterbrook ‘Workable Antitrust Policy’ (1986) 84 (8) Michigan Law Review 1696, 1702 
5 K.G. Elzinga ‘The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, what else counts?’ (1977) 125 
(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1191 
5 
 
defined the Warren Court period through to moves towards the exclusive ‘efficiency 
objective’6 advocated by the Chicago School. The final part of the chapter will assess the 
development of ‘Post-Chicago’ economics and antitrust policy, and conclude with how 
US antitrust has defined its current policy objectives under that economic metric. 
 
2.2. The Background to the Sherman Act 
Thorelli considers the aftermath of the American Civil War created a set of economic 
conditions that led to demand for the Sherman Act.7 The period saw significant industrial 
expansion and agricultural depression, the latter exacerbated by the corrupt and growing 
railroad industry. The rural population in the West were critical of the railroads and the 
Eastern capital and machinery suppliers,8 and numerous rural and Western states passed 
laws to regulate railroad rates.9 State law proved insufficient to regulate the railroads 
effectively, and so federal legislation became a necessity10 after the Wabash case,11 
which limited the ability of individual states to regulate interstate commerce. 
 
The Sherman Act is named for Republican Senator John Sherman of Ohio. In 1888, he 
developed a ‘sudden’ interest in antitrust, which William Kolasky attributes to both 
personal and partisan factors.12 At the 1888 Republican National Convention, Sherman 
lost the Presidential nomination to Benjamin Harrison. In the same contest, he had 
accused another contender, the Governor of Michigan, Russell Alger, of buying votes. In 
1889, Alger’s Diamond Match Company was penalised for monopolisation under 
                                                          
6 R.H. Bork The Antitrust Paradox (2nd ed. Free Press, New York, 1993) xi 
7 H.B. Thorelli The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition (1st ed. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1954) 160; see generally 54 – 163 
8 Ibid 160 – 161 
9 G.J. Stigler ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’ (1985) 14 (1) Journal of Legal Studies 1  
10 Thorelli American Tradition 160 – 161  
11 Wabash, St Louis & Pacific Railway Co v Illinois 118 US 557 (1886) 
12 Wm. Kolasky ‘Senator John Sherman and the Origin of Antitrust’ (2009) 24 (1) Antitrust 85, 86 
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Michigan state law in Richardson v Buehl,13 a case Sherman enthusiastically cited while 
promoting his federal antitrust bill in the Senate. Sherman was also strongly in favour of 
protective tariffs, which incumbent Democrat President Grover Cleveland had linked to 
the spread of the anticompetitive ‘trusts’. Sherman’s antitrust bill focused purely on 
antitrust and made no reference to tariff reform, and was likely an attempt to split the 
two issues ahead of the 1888 election.  
 
After a false start in the previous session, the Senate debated Sherman’s bill from 25th to 
27th March 1890. Sherman’s response was described as ‘impatient and confused’,14 and 
he lost control of the debate to Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts.15 Against 
Sherman’s wishes, the bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, who altered the 
key provisions entirely. The bill then passed both houses of Congress with near 
unanimous support (including the reluctant endorsement of Senator Sherman).16 §§ 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 have remained in force since. Senator Hoar 
observed acerbically in his memoirs that 
‘In 1890 a bill was passed which was called the Sherman Act, for no other reason that 
I can think of except that Mr Sherman had nothing to do with framing it whatever.’17 
 
2.3. Interpretations of the legislative intent of the Sherman Act 
The Congressional intent of the Sherman Act has been a matter of persistent academic 
debate.18 Hovenkamp lists a number of the prominent views:19 that Congress intended 
                                                          
13 Richardson v Buehl 77 Mich. 632 (1889) 
14 Wm. Letwin Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1st ed. 
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1967) 87 
15 21 Congressional Record 2455 (1890) 
16 Kolasky ‘Senator John Sherman’ 88  
17 G.F. Hoar Autobiography of Seventy Years (1st ed. Scribner, New York, 1903) 363 
18 Buttgieg Consumer Interest 17; Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy 49 
19 Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy 49  
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the Sherman Act to be concerned (1) ‘almost exclusively with allocative efficiency’,20 
the view advocated by the Chicago School;21 (2) with ensuring justice or fairness;22 (3) 
with preventing ‘wealth transfers away from consumers and towards price fixers or 
monopolists,’23 and (4) with support for non-consumer small business interest groups.24 
 
Additionally, there is the view that Congress intended the Sherman Act to be concerned 
with preserving the process of competition, the view advocated by Eleanor Fox.25 Fox 
defines this concept as a form of efficiency-oriented antitrust thought, though in a 
manner entirely distinct to that of the Chicago School. Finally, there is Frank 
Easterbrook’s ‘blank check’ view.26 He suggests that Congress had no principled 
intention but instead identified the offending industries and ‘told the judiciary to do 
something about it. They weren’t sure just what’.27 
 
Easterbrook also states, however, that ‘however you slice the legislative history, the 
dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overchargers’.28 He attempts to 
reconcile the ‘blank check’ position and his Chicagoan philosophy with a rationality 
argument. He states uncontroversially that courts ‘should do their best to have a sensible, 
consistent program’,29 but asserts that a ‘common law power’ is only rational when 
                                                          
20 Ibid  
21 Bork ‘Legislative Intent’ 8 
22 L. Schwartz ‘“Justice” and other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust’ (1979) 127 (4) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1076 
23 Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy 49; see R.H. Lande ‘Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: the Efficiency Interpretation Challenged’ (1982) 34 (1) Hastings Law Journal 65 
24 Stigler ‘Origin’ 3 
25 E.M. Fox ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ (1981) 66 (6) Cornell Law Review 1140, 
1169 
26 Easterbrook ‘Workable Antitrust’ 1702 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 1703 
29 Ibid  
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antitrust has a single policy objective.30 To Easterbrook, any antitrust policy with 
multiple objectives is an insensible and incoherent policy, an obfuscation which is an 
abuse of an open Congressional mandate to the federal courts.  
 
Robert Bork differs with Easterbrook on the congressional intention of the Sherman Act, 
but ultimately reaches a similar view on present antitrust objectives. While Hovenkamp 
characterises the Chicago School as advocating that ‘Economic Efficiency…should be 
the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws’,31 Bork describes it somewhat differently, stating 
that 
‘My conclusion, drawn from the evidence in the Congressional Record, is that 
Congress intended the courts to implement (that is, to take into account in the decision 
of cases) only that value we would today call consumer welfare…This requires courts 
to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase wealth through efficiency 
and those that decrease it through restriction of output.’32 
 
Bork argues that Senator Sherman’s position in the Senate debate showed ‘exclusive 
concern for consumer welfare’,33 citing sections of his remarks in the debates on his Bill 
which refer to injuries to and prices being raised for the consumer public.34 He also 
suggests that Sherman identified the phrase ‘restraint of trade’35 with the more modern 
concept of restriction of output,36 which Bork considers a key part of the ‘consumer 
welfare’ goal. 
                                                          
30 Ibid 
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While the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ makes it into the Sherman Act, Bork is less than 
convincing that Sherman’s wish for a consumer-oriented (if not necessarily a consumer 
welfare) law made it into the final Act after he lost control of its passage to Senator Hoar 
and the Judiciary Committee.37 Bork states 
‘Sherman’s original bill, which was the one debated and which was clearly carried 
forward into the redraft that became law, declared illegal two classes of 
“arrangements, contracts, trusts, or combinations”: (1) those “made with a view, or 
which tend, to prevent full and free competition”; and (2) those “designed, or which 
tend, to advance the cost to the consumer” of articles of commerce (Emphasis 
added).’38  
 
EU competition law practitioners would immediately recognise an archaic phrasing of 
‘object or effect’, a key part of the construction of the EU equivalent of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.39 Bork’s assertion that the draft clauses in the Sherman’s bill were ‘clearly 
carried forward’ does not stand up to scrutiny – the language in § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
as enacted, is fundamentally different. 
 
It is true that Senator Hoar maintained ‘that the principal objective of the new bill was 
the same as that which had prevailed ever since the introduction of the original Sherman 
bill.’40 Ultimately, the complete substitution by the Judiciary Committee of Senator 
Sherman’s draft undermines the argument that it wholly retained his intention for the bill 
                                                          
37 21 Congressional Record 2455 (1890) 
38 Bork Paradox 61 – 62  
39 Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
40 Thorelli American Tradition 200 
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to have an exclusive objective of consumer welfare. The changes add credence to the 
view that Congress intended a more multivalued approach.41 
 
Since Chicago’s ascendancy under the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, its influence 
has been such that many of its most prominent academic critics have accepted its metrics 
of efficiency and consumer welfare, if not its conclusions. Eleanor Fox sought to 
reinterpret the concept of efficiency by, as she saw it, returning it to its part in the 
‘traditional notion of competition as process.’42 Robert Lande’s alternative was that 
Congress intended the Sherman Act to be interpreted along the lines of ‘economic 
objectives, but primarily objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency 
nature.’43 
 
Fox challenges the Chicago view that efficiency can be the sole goal of antitrust law, 
preferring a multivalued approach.44 She refers in particular to Senator Sherman’s 
warning about the effect in ‘the popular mind’ of ‘the concentration of capital into vast 
combinations’.45 Her definition of efficiency is a 
‘conception [that] does not presume to define desired, efficient outcomes. It does not 
focus on consumer surplus, marginal cost, or welfare loss. It centres, rather, on an 
environment that is conducive to vigorous rivalry and in turn (it is assumed), to 
efficiency and progressiveness.’46 
 
                                                          
41 Fox ‘Equilibrium’ 1142 
42 Ibid 1169 
43 Lande ‘Wealth Transfers’ 68 
44 Fox ‘Equilibrium’ 1146 
45 21 Congressional Record 2460 (1890) 
46 Fox ‘Equilibrium’ 1169 
11 
 
Fox also places significant emphasis on ‘preserving lower barriers to entry’ to ensure 
unestablished competitors can enter and bring ‘a vital source of new spirit and new 
progressiveness’.47 In these passages she shows a distinct interpretation of the legislative 
intent of the Sherman Act which is at odds with the Chicago School, who deny the 
existence of unintended barriers to entry,48 i.e. those not directly attributable to predatory 
conduct or government intervention. 
 
Lande’s position is that, while Congress was in favour of efficiency, its intentions for the 
enactment of the Sherman Act were more distributive in nature. He relies on a section of 
Senator Sherman’s remarks, on which he notes 
‘As Senator Sherman pointed out in qualifications of his praise for efficiency, “It is 
sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by 
better methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to 
the pockets of the producer.”’49 
 
On this basis, Lande advocates that the Sherman Act is intended to create a right to a 
‘consumers’ surplus’, i.e. the right to purchase products or services at a competitive price 
rather than a monopolised price.50 Like the Chicago School,51 he is critical of the 
cornucopia of social values offered by non-economic goals of antitrust and notes the 
disputes between their advocates on how they should relate to economic goals of 
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antitrust.52 But he reserves more criticism for the Chicago School, stating that Bork 
‘incorrectly restricts the definition of [consumer welfare] to economic efficiency’.53  
 
Lande’s proposition of distributive intent is challenged strongly by Easterbrook who 
makes the case that the Sherman Act was intended purely to protect consumers. Lande 
does not dispute this, but Easterbrook considers that an approach based solely on 
efficiency is the only ‘legal’ way to achieve this. Easterbrook states 
‘Goals based on something other than efficiency…really call on judges to redistribute 
income. How much consumers should contribute to small grocers is a political choice. 
Judges have no metric, and we ought not attribute to Congress a decision to grant 
judges a political power that lacks any semblance of “legal” criteria.’54 
 
In a jurisdiction which constitutionally guarantees separation of powers, the argument 
that there was no Congressional intent to mandate the judiciary with political power 
rather than legal power is a compelling one. Easterbrook makes an arguable case for 
efficiency alone as the most credible objective for a purely legal arbitration of antitrust 
disputes.55 It has put the onus on Chicago’s detractors to show that they can successfully 
create a coherent and legal (rather than political) program for antitrust decision-making 
by the federal courts. 
 
Some academics, however, have rejected the premise that political values should be 
excluded entirely from the antitrust laws. During Chicago’s ascendancy in the late 
1970s, Robert Pitofsky stated that the ‘general American governmental preference for a 
                                                          
52 Lande ‘Wealth Transfers’ 69 
53 Ibid 87 
54 Easterbrook ‘Workable Antitrust’ 1703 – 1704 
55 Ibid 1703 
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system of checks and balances’56 supported his view that resistance to concentrations of 
economic power is a legitimate (but political) use of the antitrust statutes. He cites ‘a fear 
that excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political 
pressures’,57 and ‘economic conditions conducive to totalitarianism’.58 Thus, he supports 
antitrust intervention as a less drastic check on the free market, on the basis that an 
unfettered free market would inevitably create overwhelming societal pressure for ‘direct 
regulation or Marxist solutions’.59 This is built on by Louis Schwartz who notes 
‘American imposition of antitrust measures upon conquered Germany and Japan after 
World War II…the dominant motivation was political: a desire to create alternative 
centres of power that could not readily be marshalled behind authoritarian regimes.’60  
 
But while Pitofsky rejects the inclusion of small business welfare in antitrust 
enforcement,61 Schwartz contends that a running theme of subsequent legislation (not 
all, it should be said, directly related to antitrust) cannot be ignored, stating 
‘A judge or administrator who wishes to be responsive to the will of Congress can 
hardly fail to catch the drift of these legislative enactments. Collectively, they portray 
a view of the public interest that must pervade the interpretation of the antitrust laws, 
whether or not one approves of all these “preferences” for small business.’62 
 
However, significant weight cannot be given to Schwartz’s position on subsequent 
legislation. Hovenkamp has cautioned against the view, considering that, while other 
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57 Ibid 1051 
58 Ibid 1052 
59 Ibid 1057; see also Thorelli American Tradition 180 and Senator Sherman at 21 Congressional Record 2460 
(1890) 
60 Schwartz ‘Non-Economic Goals’ 1077 – 1078 
61 Pitofsky ‘Political Content’ 1058 
62 Schwartz ‘Non-Economic Goals’ 1077 
14 
 
Acts may be relevant, they are not directly applicable to antitrust cases considered solely 
under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.63 
 
2.4. The early development of US antitrust case law 
Over time, Sherman Act case law has articulated a changing set of antitrust policy 
objectives. Much of the case law reflects the prevailing view of its time. This section 
will critique the early development from 1890 until the beginning of the Warren Court 
period, when the character of antitrust case law changed significantly.  
 
Western United States railroad cases were, appropriately, among the early Sherman Act 
cases to reach the Supreme Court.64 United States v Trans-Missouri Freight 
Association65 came to the Supreme Court on appeal from the 8th Circuit.66 The US 
Attorney General had ordered the dissolution of the defendant, an association of railroad 
companies created ‘for the purpose of maintaining reasonable rates to be received by 
each company executing the agreements’,67 i.e. price fixing. The 8th Circuit had affirmed 
the trial court’s judgment in favour of the defendant, setting out a reasonableness test 
based on balancing ‘contracts made for a lawful purpose which were not unreasonably 
injurious to the public welfare’.68  
 
The Supreme Court overturned the 8th Circuit’s decision by a narrow five to four 
majority. Justice Peckham gave the majority opinion and Justice White led the dissent. 
Bork characterises the distinction between the two approaches, stating that ‘Peckham 
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proposed to judge the legality of the restraint by its character, White by its degree’69. 
Peckham’s opinion rejects the reasonable rates argument, finding it contradictory and 
entirely counter to the aim of maintaining competition. He states 
‘The claim that the company has the right to charge reasonable rates, and that, 
therefore, it has the right to enter into a combination with competing roads to maintain 
such rates, cannot be admitted. The conclusion does not follow from an admission of 
the premise…Competition will itself bring charges down to what may be reasonable, 
while in the case of an agreement to keep prices up, competition is allowed no play; it 
is shut out, and the rate is practically fixed by the companies themselves by virtue of 
the agreement, so long as they abide by it.’70 
  
Peckham’s opinion was the first Sherman Act decision to create a rule of per se 
illegality, for horizontal price fixing.71 Bork, firmly in favour of per se illegality in this 
context, states ‘Justice Peckham led a narrow majority that chose consumer welfare as 
the law’s guiding policy’.72 His conclusion that Trans-Missouri displays a consumer 
welfare objective is contradicted by Fox, who states 
‘In the early years, the Supreme Court applied the Sherman Act…in a manner that 
reflected the multivalued legislative history and the desire to protect competition for 
the benefit of all – consumers, entrepreneurs, and “the public good.”’73 
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One passage of Justice Peckham’s opinion is at odds with Bork’s claim that he 
interpreted the Sherman Act as exclusively concerned with consumer welfare.74 Justice 
Peckham states his concern that 
‘In business or trading combinations they may even temporarily, or perhaps 
permanently, reduce the price of the article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the 
expense inseparable from the running of many different companies for the same 
purpose. Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly 
and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and worthy 
men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust 
themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the 
commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the 
absorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of 
capital.’75 
 
Bork dismisses it as ‘a slip rather than a deliberate policy statement’,76 but that is 
somewhat undermined by the fact that Peckham is careful to draw a distinction between 
damage to ‘small dealers and worthy men’ done by technological progress – ‘these are 
misfortunes which seem to be the necessary accompaniment of all great industrial 
changes’77 – and damage done by purposive anti-competitive conduct – ‘It is wholly 
different, however, when such changes are effected by combinations of capital, whose 
purpose in combining is to control the production or manufacture of any particular 
article in the market’.78 It lends credence to Fox’s view that the Sherman Act intended to 
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protect businesses as well as consumers,79 although Bork is largely correct that the 
policy objective of ‘small-business welfare’ was not given ‘operative weight’80 until the 
Chicago Board of Trade case.81 
 
The following year saw two further significant Sherman Act decisions, which deal with 
the crucial subject of which contracts can be declared legal even if they restrain trade to 
some extent. The facts of United States v Joint Traffic Association82 were analogous to 
Trans-Missouri. The principal decision merely follows Trans-Missouri without much 
further analysis, with the Court splitting 5 to 4 on the same lines.83 However, it provides 
one significant point of clarity in Justice Peckham’s response to an extensive submission 
by counsel for the defendant. Counsel had submitted ‘a formidable list’ of common 
business contracts that would allegedly be declared illegal by the statutory construction 
Trans-Missouri placed on the Sherman Act.84  
 
The list included pay bargaining agreements, incorporation, partnerships, wholesalers 
purchasing from several producers, distribution agreements, non-compete agreements, 
mergers and acquisitions, and restrictions attached to the sale of heritable property.85 
Peckham rejects the defendant’s submission thus 
‘To suppose, as is assumed by counsel, that the effect of the decision in the Trans-
Missouri case is to render illegal most business contracts or combinations, however 
indispensable and necessary they may be, because, as they assert, they all restrain 
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trade in some remote and indirect degree, is to make a most violent assumption and 
one not called for or justified by the decision mentioned, or by any other decision of 
this court.’86 
 
Bork claims that Justice Peckham’s Joint Traffic opinion ‘made [his] pro-consumer 
orientation clearer’87 than it had been in Trans-Missouri as 
‘each example involves both the agreed elimination of actual or potential rivalry and 
the integration of the parties’ productive economic activities or facilities. The rate 
agreements declared illegal per se in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic involved only 
the first of these elements. Thus, Peckham seemed to be saving from the per se rule 
any agreement with the capacity for creating efficiency.’88 
 
This passage is evidence that Justice Peckham considered consumer welfare to be an 
objective of antitrust policy. However, it should not be considered as supporting Bork’s 
contention that consumer welfare is the intended exclusive goal of US antitrust policy.89 
Joint Traffic does not contradict Trans-Missouri, it affirms it in full.90 Insofar as Trans-
Missouri stands for the protection of ‘small dealers and worthy men’,91 so too does Joint 
Traffic. 
 
The second decision is the 6th Circuit decision in United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co,92 described by Bork as ‘one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in 
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the history of the law’.93 It is certainly the most significant Sherman Act decision from 
the lower courts. The judgment does not just dutifully follow Trans-Missouri, as one 
might expect of a subordinate court, but contributed an articulate and highly significant 
opinion on the interpretation of the Sherman Act. That is down to the character of the 6th 
Circuit judge, William Howard Taft, who wrote the opinion. 
 
Taft is largely remembered as an inept one-term President of the United States who 
struggled in the shadow of his charismatic predecessor Theodore Roosevelt. However, 
he does remain the only man to have served as both President and Chief Justice of the 
United States. His judicial accomplishments significantly eclipsed his political ones, 
with Justice Frankfurter observing it was ‘difficult for me to understand why a man who 
is so good a Chief Justice…could have been so bad as President’.94 
 
Taft, therefore, holds the dubious distinction of being far more revered by antitrust 
lawyers than by the general public, but that should not detract from the deeply principled 
and detailed opinion in Addyston Pipe. It is far clearer than Joint Traffic in articulating a 
‘workable formula for judging restraints’.95 Taft uses the example of a business 
partnership to develop his ‘ancillary restraint’ concept, stating 
‘When two men became partners in a business, although their union might reduce 
competition, this effect was only an incident to the main purpose of a union of their 
capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the 
community. Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the 
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members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, were, 
of course, only ancillary to the main end of the union, and were to be encouraged.’96 
 
Taft goes further and provided one of the earliest significant treatments of vertical 
restraints. He cited Chicago, St Louis & New Orleans Railroad Co v Pullman Southern 
Car Co,97 which concerned an agreement under which the railroad company granted a 
sleeping-car company the exclusive right to provide sleeper services on the railroad. Taft 
considered that the restraint on competition was ancillary to the purpose of providing a 
financially viable sleeping car service on the railroad,98 and would therefore be legal 
under his ancillary restraint test.  
 
Taft is vociferous in his support of Justice Peckham’s majority opinions in Trans-
Missouri and Joint Traffic. He describes operating Justice White’s proposed process of 
determining whether a restraint of trade is reasonable as to ‘set sail on a sea of doubt’.99 
Bork concludes that 
‘Taft’s argument would validate all vertical arrangements. In a vertical case there is 
always economic integration between the parties…so the main condition of the 
ancillarity test is satisfied’.100 
  
However, to a certain extent, this is an assertion. Bork does not properly deal with the 
question of whether vertical economic integration can ever cause a primary rather than 
an ancillary restraint on trade.  
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The Chicago School’s contented interpretation of the early Sherman Act case law ends 
abruptly with the Dr Miles case in 1911.101 The case concerned a medicine manufacturer 
who placed minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) obligations on its distributors. 
Justice Hughes equated the agreement imposed by the upstream manufacturer to a 
horizontal cartel agreed between the downstream distributors, and declared minimum 
RPM to be per se illegal.102 It would be nearly a century before that per se illegality was 
reversed.103   
 
The other major cases of 1911 were Standard Oil104 and American Tobacco,105 
monopolisation cases on broadly similar points. Justice White’s majority opinions in 
both demonstrated a conversion from his position in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic. 
He adopted a three-part rule of reason which included scope for per se illegality rules,106 
which Bork summarises thus 
‘White’s rule of reason, then, may be phrased as a three-part test: (1) “inherent 
nature” or the per se concept; (2) “inherent effect” or market power; and (3) “evident 
purpose” or specific intent. The rule of reason was thus not composed of any 
particular substantive rules but was entirely a mode of analysis, a system for directing 
investigation and decision.’107  
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However, Bork criticises Justice White’s failure to distinguish the ‘rule of reason’ he 
stated in Standard Oil from the different concept he applied the same term of art to in 
Trans-Missouri.108 The confusion this caused led to Congress passing further antitrust 
legislation in 1914.109 Despite this, Bork does claim that Justice White intended in 
Standard Oil to articulate consumer welfare as the sole objective of antitrust policy.110 
He claims that the points White makes against monopolies can be understood as facets of 
restriction of output,111 deconstructing the passage of Standard Oil where White states 
‘The evils which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the final denial of 
the power to make them may be thus summarily stated: (1) The power which the 
monopoly gave to the one who enjoyed it, to fix the price and thereby injure the 
public; (2) The power which it engendered of enabling a limitation on production; and 
(3) The danger of deterioration in quality of the monopolized article which it was 
deemed was the inevitable resultant of the monopolistic control over its production 
and sale.’112 
 
Lande challenges this view, emphasising that Standard Oil was one of several cases that 
recognised ‘the legislators feared not only the economic consequences of monopoly 
power, but potential social disruptions as well’.113 This is confirmed by Justice White’s 
analysis of the Sherman Act debates, where he concluded the main concern was ‘the vast 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals’.114 
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In 1913, President Taft lost re-election to Woodrow Wilson, who moved immediately to 
reform antitrust law by passing the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
In 1918, Justice Louis Brandeis, a Wilson nominee to the Supreme Court, delivered an 
opinion that showed a clear shift in the prevailing objectives of antitrust law away from 
the pro-consumer, efficiency objectives espoused in Trans-Missouri, Addyston and 
Standard Oil. 
 
Chicago Board of Trade v United States concerned the internal regulations of the 
Chicago grain market, the largest in the world at the time.115 The Board had limited its 
members’ trading time to only part of each day. The District Court had held the trade 
restriction to be illegal per se.116 
 
Reversing the decision of the District Court, Brandeis adopted a rule of reason that bears 
no relation to the one in Standard Oil. Indeed, his judgment is short and makes no 
reference to precedent at all. Bork describes the ruling as ‘more like White’s 1897 
Trans-Missouri dissent than any other prior case’.117 It advocates a subjective approach, 
stating ‘the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied’118 and several other factors. Brandeis concludes that the ‘evidence 
admitted makes it clear that the rule was a reasonable regulation of business consistent 
with the provisions of the Anti-Trust Law’119 – an implicit failure to follow the majority 
opinion in Trans-Missouri without explanation. 
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Bork describes Brandeis’ opinion as the first to give ‘operative weight’ to ‘small 
business welfare’.120 This is evident from several of Brandeis’ points on the Chicago 
grain market, stating it ‘was disadvantageous to all concerned, but particularly so to 
country dealers and farmers’,121 and that it ‘enabled country dealers to do business on a 
smaller margin’.122 
 
The looming twin spectres of the Great Depression and the Second World War that soon 
followed left a lasting economic legacy. The former led to a significant rise in 
government economic intervention to maintain wages and prices.123 The Supreme Court 
had a mixed approach to New Deal interventionism, ruling the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933 was unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry v United States,124 but 
allowing significant scope for price controls and other significant economic regulation in 
Nebbia v New York.125 The latter led to fear that excessive concentrations of economic 
power caused significant vulnerability to the rise of totalitarianism.126 It was a key factor 
in the genesis of European competition law,127 and its legacy produced a radical change 
in antitrust case law in the postwar period. 
 
2.5. The Postwar and Warren Court Period 
The conclusion of World War II left the United States in an exceedingly strong global 
position. American infrastructure and heavy industry had survived largely unscathed 
while the European powers’ industrial areas were in ruins. Exports, production, and 
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employment all boomed.128 Kauper states ‘It was easy to ignore concerns over efficiency 
and to adopt policies focused on protecting and rewarding small enterprises. This highly 
interventionist antitrust policy was a luxury we could afford.’129 
 
Concern regarding industrial concentration and significant latitude for low-risk 
economic interventionism led to a period where the focus of antitrust moved away from 
cartels and onto monopolisation. The 2nd Circuit Alcoa ruling by Judge Learned Hand set 
the tone in 1945.130 The United States government brought an action under both §§ 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act against two major aluminum producers. Learned Hand equates 
monopolies to horizontal price-fixing cartels, stating 
‘It would be absurd to condemn such contracts [price-fixing agreements] 
unconditionally, and not to extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts 
are only steps toward that entire control which monopoly confers: they are really 
partial monopolies.’131 
 
Bork rejects Hand’s contention on the basis that monopolies provide an efficiency 
defence that cannot be applied to a cartel.132 Eleanor Fox confirms that the facts of Alcoa 
would not meet the test for an illegal monopoly based purely on restriction of output,133 
though she states that ‘output theory provides a basis for challenging monopoly of a sort 
that virtually never exists’.134 
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Hand articulated the prevailing view of scepticism towards industrial concentrations, 
clearly allowing for non-economic considerations to be given operative weight in 
antitrust policy 
‘We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monopoly; but, 
as we have already implied, there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial 
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the 
debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself…showed that among the purposes of 
Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because 
of the helplessness of the individual before them…Throughout the history of these 
statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate 
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry 
in small units which can effectively compete with each other.’135 [Emphasis added] 
 
Alcoa led the way for the antitrust policy followed by the Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969. Kauper states that  
‘Today, antitrust doctrine formulated by the Supreme Court in those days seems a 
kind of historical curiosity, an anachronism. To those of us involved with antitrust 
forty years ago, however, those decisions were the reality of antitrust. We had to deal 
with them every day, often in giving advice to disbelieving clients.’136 
 
Learned Hand’s opinion on the defendant’s submissions provide a stark indication of 
why the business community were sceptical of the Warren Court’s antitrust policy. He 
states their actions 
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‘stimulated demand and opened new uses for the metal, but not without making sure 
that it could supply what it had evoked…It insists that it never excluded competitors; 
but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each 
new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already 
geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade 
connections and the elite of personnel.’137  
 
It is evident that any businessman who places value on innovation would find the above 
passage inexplicable. It would not only be Thomas Kauper’s clients, but businesses all 
over the United States, who would have reacted with disbelief to their lawyers’ 
explanations of Warren Court era antitrust policy. 
 
The 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act,138 brought by Congressman 
Emanuel Celler because of the concern that industrial concentrations in Germany had led 
to the rise of Hitler,139 strengthened the Clayton Act’s section on merger control. The 
Justice Department’s antitrust actions refocused away from monopolization and onto 
merger control as the principal means of challenging industrial concentration. The peaks 
of the Warren Court’s merger interventionism were Brown Shoe140 in 1961 and Von’s 
Grocery in 1966.141 Admittedly both concerned mergers of large companies, but hardly 
leading to a concentration which would come to dominate the market. The combined 
market share of the concentration declared illegal in Von’s Grocery was under ten 
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percent.142 The Court’s antitrust policy prioritised protecting the process of competition 
over consumer welfare. Chief Justice Warren stated in Brown Shoe that  
‘some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to 
consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small 
independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not competitors, 
which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote 
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. 
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing 
considerations in favour of decentralization.’143 
 
Criticism of Brown Shoe from the Chicago School was fierce. Bork accuses Chief 
Justice Warren of ignoring the criteria of § 7 of the Clayton Act (as amended) and using 
Brown Shoe ‘to convert the statute to a virulently anticompetitive regulation’.144 He 
states that ‘rational law…must draw the line between mergers that create wealth and 
those that decrease it’.145 Bork implies that the Supreme Court’s antitrust policy gave an 
unacceptable level of discretion to an activist Justice Department.146 This is indicated by 
his reference to Justice Potter Stewart’s dissent in Von’s Grocery, who stated ‘The sole 
consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always 
wins’.147 
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Justice Stewart had previously found himself in the minority with Justice John Harlan in 
the 1963 Philadelphia National Bank case.148 Harlan and Stewart objected to the 
increasingly stretched scope of § 7 of the Clayton Act.149 However, it is also a case of 
note because it provides an excellent example of the Warren Court’s rejection of 
economic evidence, in the context of its problematic approach to definition of the 
relevant market. 
 
The proposed merger was between the second and third largest banks in the city of 
Philadelphia.150 The US Treasury had cleared the proposed merger despite reports that it 
would have anticompetitive effects in the Philadelphia area. Their reasoning was that 
‘there will remain an adequate number of alternative sources of banking service in 
Philadelphia, and in view of the beneficial effects of this consolidation upon 
international and national competition it was concluded that the over-all effect upon 
competition would not be unfavourable.’151  
 
The defendants’ argument was that the purpose of the concentration was not to attempt 
to monopolize the Philadelphia market, but to achieve sufficient size to compete with the 
far larger national banks in New York.152 This would not only increase competition in 
the market for national loans, but boost economic development in Philadelphia. Pitofsky 
considered the defendants’ position to be of significant weight, and certainly not a 
unique situation. He notes 
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‘The argument in defense of the merger certainly does not appear frivolous…there are 
bound to be many cases in which a lessening of competition in some narrow market is 
counterbalanced by increases in competition in a different larger market.’153 
 
The Supreme Court dismissed this view, concluding that anticompetitive effects in the 
relevant market could not be justified by procompetitive effects in another market. The 
majority saw that argument simply as a potential loophole in § 7.154 The minority 
contended the enactment was not applicable,155 and criticised the majority for 
undermining the rule of reason, and preventing firms from developing to meet modern 
economic demands.156 By the end of the Warren Court period, antitrust policy was 
perceived to be holding the business community back. 
 
Almost all the Warren Court period antitrust decisions are no longer good law.157 An 
antitrust policy which prioritised the protection of small businesses over the costs to the 
consumer undoubtedly was swept away by the societal changes of the 1970s.158 As other 
industrial nations restored their industrial bases, the US lost its postwar dominance in 
global markets. There was significant public concern about US economic downturn, and 
a general sense of pessimism from the Carter administration.159 Kauper concludes that 
‘An antitrust policy based on efficiency concerns fit these concerns almost perfectly’.160 
The time of the Chicago School had come. 
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2.6. The Chicago School Revolution 
Peter Gerhart cites the six Supreme Court cases from 1975 to 1980 which form the apex 
of Chicagoan influence, and a seventh where the Supreme Court departs from that 
consistency in 1982.161 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar affirmed that horizontal price 
fixing by professionals setting minimum fee schedules was per se illegal.162 National 
Society of Professional Engineers v United States extended the same to bid rigging.163 
Catalano v Target Sales held an agreement between competitors to restrict credit 
constituted per se illegal horizontal price fixing.164 Reiter v Sonotone Corporation 
redefined the interpretation of § 4 of the Clayton Act,165 so that antitrust violation 
damages were quantified in line with consumer welfare principles.166 
 
But it was the radical reform of the law relating to vertical restraints where Chicagoan 
thought has had the greatest significance. Broadcast Music v Columbia Broadcasting 
System167 has had significant influence on antitrust law relating to intellectual property 
law, ruling that blanket licensing for music distribution provided efficiency gains that 
precluded a finding of per se illegality. Undoubtedly, however, the most significant of 
the six cases is Continental TV v GTE Sylvania.168  
 
Sylvania arose from a multi-faceted dispute between a television manufacturer and its 
San Francisco retail franchisor.169 It came before the Supreme Court on the question of 
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whether ‘Sylvania had violated s 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing 
franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from 
specified locations’.170 The Supreme Court noted that the 1963 case of Arnold 
Schwinn,171 which had ruled that vertical market division was illegal per se, had been 
subject to significant academic criticism,172 citing in particular prominent Chicagoans 
Donald Baker and Richard Posner.173  
 
The Supreme Court overruled Schwinn and replaced per se illegality with a rule of 
reason for vertical territorial restraints.174 They considered that Schwinn had departed 
from the correct approach for determining the appropriateness of per se illegality, the 
Northern Pacific test.175 The Supreme Court went further and articulated the potential 
benefits of such restraints, stating 
‘Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to 
achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These “redeeming 
virtues” are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of 
reason. Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use 
such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers.’176  
 
Bork described the decision as ‘adopting a mode of reasoning that will prove 
enormously beneficial if employed throughout antitrust’.177 He notes correctly that 
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‘Justice Powell for the majority and Justice White in concurrence gave weight to 
business efficiency in framing their respective rules’.178 
 
Since Sylvania, the Supreme Court has not handed down a decision which so 
comprehensively accepts Chicago School doctrine, but the direction of travel it created 
on the per se illegality of vertical restraints has been permanent. The route from Sylvania 
to Leegin, which lifted the per se illegality of minimum RPM three decades later,179 is 
clear and supported by a significant body of academic work.180  
 
The Supreme Court departed from Chicagoan analysis in Arizona v Maricopa County 
Medical Society.181 Gerhart criticised the majority opinion as ‘retrogressive: it 
champions a wooden, mechanical view of the per se rules and fails to recognize the full 
range of circumstances in which trade restraints may promote competition.’182 Maricopa 
County suffers from the absence of two Supreme Court justices; Justice Stevens gives a 
4-3 majority opinion. The dissenting opinion was given by Justice Powell,183 who gave 
the majority opinion in Sylvania.184 
  
The State of Arizona acted against the defendants for price-fixing – the Society was 
created to establish a maximum fee schedule to allow for a streamlined relationship 
between local doctors and the insurance industry.185 Justice Stevens dismisses without 
much analysis the Society’s argument that ‘the doctors’ agreement not to charge certain 
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insureds more than a fixed price facilitates the successful marketing of an attractive 
insurance plan’.186  
 
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion relied on distinguishing Maricopa County from 
Broadcast Music.187 He concludes that ‘This case is fundamentally different…Their 
combination in the form of the foundation does not permit them to sell any different 
product.’188 Powell’s dissent is critical of Stevens’ interpretation of Broadcast Music. 
Powell argues that Maricopa County should have followed Broadcast Music on the 
grounds of efficiency, stating 
‘the two agreements are similar in important respects. Each involved competitors and 
resulted in cooperative pricing. Each arrangement also was prompted by the need for 
better service to the consumers. And each arrangement apparently makes possible a 
new product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies. The Court’s effort to 
distinguish Broadcast Music thus is unconvincing.’189 
 
The majority acknowledged the defendant’s argument that maximum fee schedules 
promoted efficiency; allowing more accurate risk calculations, reducing costs and thus 
saving both the industry and consumer significant sums.190 Justice Powell cites these as 
clear evidence of consumer benefit.191 Some academic analysis of the effect of 
maximum fee schedules has supported Justice Powell’s position in Maricopa County,192 
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though others have shown scepticism towards ‘provider-controlled’ fee schedules while 
supporting those drafted by insurers.193 
 
In short, Maricopa County represented a deeply problematic and messy drift away from 
the dominance of the Chicago School. During the 1980s, Eleanor Fox was the 
Chicagoans’ most notable critic.194 It would, however, be almost a decade after 
Maricopa County before her prediction that ‘the courts will slay the paper dragon from 
Chicago’195 came about. 
  
2.7. The Post-Chicago School 
Critics of Chicagoan economics began calls for a ‘post-Chicago’ antitrust policy in the 
1980s.196 However, the criticism was not due to a lack of respect. Hovenkamp states that 
‘The Chicago School of antitrust analysis is the most coherent and elegant ideology 
that antitrust has ever experienced. One must admire its simplicity, as well as its 
confidence in markets and its optimism. Nevertheless, those who found markets to be 
somewhat messier and Chicago economics less robust, began in the 1980s to call for a 
“post-Chicago” antitrust policy that would take the best that the Chicago School had 
to offer as a point of departure, and then develop an antitrust policy that was more 
sensitive to market imperfections.’197 
 
                                                          
193 D.W. Kallstrom ‘Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act’ 
(1978) 27 (2) Duke Law Journal 645, 678 – 684 
194 E.M. Fox ‘Consumer Beware Chicago’ (1986) 84 (8) Michigan Law Review 1714; E.M. Fox and L.A. 
Sullivan ‘Antitrust – Retrospective and Prospective: Where are we coming from? Where are we going?’ (1987) 
62 (5) New York University Law Review 936 
195 Fox and Sullivan ‘Retrospective and Prospective’ 968 
196 H. Hovenkamp ‘Post-Chicago Economics: A Review and Critique’ (2001) 16 (2) Columbia Business Law 
Review 257, 258 
197 Ibid 
36 
 
The ‘breakthrough’198 Supreme Court case for Post-Chicago economics was the 
controversial 1992 Kodak decision.199 Kodak concerned market power in aftermarkets.200 
Kodak had placed serious restrictions on the ability of the respondent Independent 
Service Organisations (ISOs) to compete in the market for parts and servicing of Kodak 
equipment, against Kodak itself.201 
 
Justice Blackmun’s 6-3 majority opinion relied on Jefferson Parish202 in finding the 
possibility of separate aftermarkets for parts and services.203 While Blackmun considered 
that the existence of the high-technology service industry was evidence enough of it 
being a potential efficiency for consumers,204 he considered that the links between the 
two aftermarkets created by Kodak constituted a tying arrangement. Kodak had refused 
to sell parts to consumers whose Kodak equipment was serviced by the ISOs.205 
 
It was agreed that Kodak lacked market power in the primary photocopier market. 
Justice Blackmun rejected their submissions that they did not exercise market power in 
the aftermarket206 in consideration of the important post-Chicago concept of imperfect 
information,207 stating that 
‘Given the potentially high cost of information and the possibility that a seller may be 
able to price discriminate between knowledgeable and unsophisticated customers, it 
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makes little sense to assume, in the absence of any evidentiary support, that 
equipment purchasing decisions are based on an accurate assessment of the total cost 
of equipment, service, and parts over the lifetime of the machine.’208  
 
Justice Scalia’s dissent is based principally on Chicagoan criticism of the per se 
illegality of tying arrangements.209 He is sceptical about applying the antitrust laws to 
aftermarkets, stating 
‘The Court today finds in the typical manufacturer’s inherent power over its own 
brand of equipment – over the sale of distinctive repair pairs for that equipment, for 
example – the sort of “monopoly power” sufficient to bring the sledgehammer of § 2 
into play. And, not surprisingly in light of that insight, it readily labels single-brand 
power over aftermarket products “market power” sufficient to permit an antitrust 
plaintiff to invoke the per se rule against tying. In my opinion, this makes no 
economic sense.’210 
 
Scalia dismisses Blackmun’s argument on ‘information costs’ as a truism.211 He 
proposes a distinction between circumstantial and market power. Scalia concedes 
aftermarkets can give a manufacturer ‘leverage’, but states it is not ‘attributable to the 
dominant party’s market power in any relevant sense’.212 While he is of the view that 
such leverage can cause consumer injury,213 he cites with approval a dissenting opinion 
of Richard Posner that states such negative outcomes are ‘a brief perturbation in 
competitive conditions – not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry 
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about’.214 In something of a last stand for the Chicago School, Scalia makes a plea to 
limit antitrust interventions 
‘In my view, if the interbrand market is vibrant, it is simply not necessary to enlist § 
2’s machinery to police a seller’s intrabrand restraints. In such circumstances, the 
interbrand market functions as an infinitely more efficient and more precise corrective 
to such behaviour, rewarding the seller whose intrabrand restraints enhance consumer 
welfare while punishing the seller whose control of the aftermarkets is viewed 
unfavourably by interbrand consumers.’215 
 
The Kodak decision was not followed by a unified school of post-Chicagoan thought. 
Hovenkamp considers that ‘under post-Chicago antitrust analysis, the market has 
become a far messier place’.216 Sullivan notes that post-Chicagoans do not always agree 
on outcomes.217 The range in Post-Chicagoan opinion was indicated by the breadth of 
views in the 1995 Antitrust Law Journal Symposium on Post-Chicago Economics. 
Borenstein et al. are more supportive of antitrust intervention,218 while Carl Shapiro is 
more sceptical.219 Sullivan describes the latter as ‘perhaps a bit nostalgic for Chicago 
legal certainties’.220 
 
Borenstein et al. justify their preference for intervention by reference to the imperfect 
information considerations from Kodak. They state that ‘information imperfections tend 
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to make perfect, complete contracting infeasible and thus make contract law less useful 
in aftermarket cases.’221 Carl Shapiro, by contrast, is far more sceptical of the Kodak 
ruling, stating it ‘holds considerable dangers of restraining the behaviour of firms that 
possess no genuine monopoly power’.222 A decade after Kodak, Hovenkamp expressed 
concern for the direction post-Chicago antitrust had taken, stating 
‘post-Chicago antitrust economics has had only limited success. Perhaps its biggest 
failure has been the Supreme Court’s Kodak decision and its aftermath. When that 
decision was first handed down it threatened to turn many competitive firms with 
unique aftermarkets parts or service into “monopolists” for antitrust purposes. In 
reality, it has not had that effect but it has burdened the courts with much unnecessary 
and costly litigation. That experiment should be proclaimed a failure and Kodak itself 
overruled.’223 
 
Ultimately, the post-Chicago school replaced the consistent but flawed economic 
assumptions of the Chicagoans with an acceptance of the fact that ‘markets are much 
more varied and complex than Chicago theorists were willing to admit’.224 However, the 
policy objectives of the Chicago School have been entrenched. Shapiro states that  
‘If “Post-Chicago Economics” stands for the notion that markets are subject to 
numerous imperfections, as indeed the Court recognized in Kodak, let me be counted 
in the “Post-Chicago” camp. However, if “Post-Chicago Economics” stands for the 
notion that courts are capable of fine-tuning firms’ behaviour in competitive markets, 
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or that antitrust should move away from promoting efficiency and consumer welfare, 
count me out.’225  
 
2.8. Conclusions 
Bork, in the introduction to the 2nd edition of The Antitrust Paradox, described ‘mingled 
satisfaction and chagrin that I look over the course of that law since 1978. Satisfaction is 
justified because antitrust has moved a long way in the direction urged by this book’.226 
It is clear from post-Chicagoan analysis that, while the flawed economic assumptions of 
the Chicago School are no longer a part of US antitrust policy, the policy objectives 
Bork espoused, efficiency and consumer welfare, have been sustained, and continue to 
be the prevailing objectives of US antitrust to the present day. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE ORGINS AND OBJECTIVES OF EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW 
3.1. Introduction 
European Union competition law has deep roots in the continent’s turbulent history. It 
has been a key part of the ‘European Project’ from its earliest days. It was recognised as 
a means to prevent the return to the economic conditions which had facilitated the World 
Wars. This chapter will assess the history of the European economy, with particular 
reference to the role of cartels in the economic development of Germany. It will then go 
on to critique the political and economic influences that led to the foundation of the 
Community and the early development of its competition policy. Finally, it will assess 
the changes in competition policy objectives made by decisions of the Court of Justice 
and statements from the Commission, concluding with a statement of the EU’s present 
policy objectives. 
 
3.2. The History of Cartels in Germany 
No European state has an ‘antitrust tradition’ like that found in the US. State-level 
antitrust laws propagated following the Civil War, and the US had enacted federal 
antitrust legislation by 1890.1 By contrast, few European governments of the time had 
enacted any effective anti-cartel policies, and their attitude to cartels generally ranged 
from ambivalence to enthusiasm. 
 
While modern European competition law was developed as part of the postwar reforms, 
the impetus for creating a supranational competition policy is deeply linked to the 
history of the European powers, particularly Germany. The process of industrialisation 
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in Germany was distinct to that of France and the United Kingdom – it began later in the 
19th century and was significantly more rapid.2 This made it far more prone to 
cartelisation. Germany did not unify as a single state until 1870, which hampered earlier 
industrialisation. When the Germanic states instituted a customs union in the 1850s, it 
prompted rapid, disruptive change.3 The social change concurrent to industrial revolution 
occurred in Germany in half the time it had taken in Britain.4 Gerber considers that this 
had a profound effect on public perception of industrialisation in Germany, stating 
‘The intensity and character of German industrialisation made competition seem not 
only an unreliable means of organising economic life, but a menacing one…giving 
capitalism, competition and the entire process of economic modernisation a somewhat 
demonic air.’5 
 
This created significant public demand for an organised rather than purely competitive 
economy.6 However, industry leaders rapidly created an economy dubbed the ‘Land of 
the Cartels’,7 where cartels acquired an unusual permanence.8 Gerber considers that the 
‘dramatically expanded industrial capacity…impelled firms in such industries to share 
markets with each other rather than compete and risk huge losses’.9 He also cites as 
factors a susceptibility of key German industries to cartelisation; an unusually high 
dependence on banking finance, which led banks to organise cartels between creditors to 
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minimise the risk of defaults; and the abrupt shift to a protectionist tariff regime by 
Chancellor Bismarck less than a decade after German unification.10 
 
In 1905, an official report cited by Kantzenbach reported 385 cartels with 12,000 
members, who dominated the German economy.11 The German Supreme Court Saxony 
Wood Pulp case in 1893 exacerbated the problem, encouraging rapid growth of cartels. 
Struggling producers had agreed to sell their products through a single, collective 
agent.12 A renegade member defended a breach of contract action, submitting the cartel 
had violated an 1869 German law guaranteeing ‘the principle of business freedom’. The 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the cartel agreement had been invalidated.13 In 
analysing the business freedom principle, the Court considered that it incorporated a 
public interest element, but concluded that cartels were beneficial to the public.14 Gerber 
states 
‘According to the Court…“if the firms in a particular branch band together to 
eliminate or control price reductions among themselves, their co-operation can be 
seen not only as a justified application of the drive to self-preservation, but also – as a 
general rule – a service to the public, provided that such prices really are continuously 
so low that economic ruin threatens the firms”…The Court reasoned that by 
preserving competitors from ruin and maintaining adequate prices cartels helped to 
prevent the economic “catastrophes…associated with overproduction”. This policy 
judgment was the cornerstone of cartel ‘legalization’.’15 
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Gerber criticises the judgment for marginalising the notion of consumer fairness, noting 
that the cartel held a regional monopoly.16 The Court was apparently naïve about the 
level at which the cartel would fix prices; they considered that it would make controlled 
reductions over time, rather than increasing to a monopoly price. Kuenzler and 
Warlouzet’s view is that public opinion, sceptical of excessive competition, would have 
assumed that the cartel would maintain reasonable prices, and thus been supportive of 
the judgment.17 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, German public opinion turned against cartels.18 
Proposals for cartel law reform were debated but largely came to nothing.19 Kaiser 
Wilhelm was the most significant opponent of reform, fixated on 
‘advancing Germany’s economic and military might, and thus he was not inclined to 
accept threats to its industrial base. The heavy industries that supplied ships and 
military hardware were heavily cartelised, and the desire to protect them was reason 
enough for him to oppose cartel legislation.’20 
 
Pace describes the Kaiser’s policy as ‘competitive imperialism’.21 Wilhelm prioritised 
state-to-state competition with the other major powers over the maintenance of the 
domestic competitive process. Norr states 
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‘In the context of competition between Nations in the global marketplace, cartels 
played the role of industrial organisations to combat foreign competition and 
particularly the American trusts. It would have been unthinkable to combat cartels 
only on German territory.’22 [Emphasis added] 
 
Following the First World War, the destruction of European industrial capacity and 
Germany’s postwar liabilities shifted the focus of German cartels.23 The previous focus 
of German cartels was restriction of output to maximise profits, which was untenable in 
economic conditions where demand significantly outstripped supply.24 Hyperinflation 
from 1921 to 1923 provided a new impetus for cartels, passing the economic damage 
onto the consumer.25 Cartels lost their positive public perception as economic changes 
led to the opinion that the cartels were causing hyperinflation.26 Despite weak anti-cartel 
laws enacted by the Weimar Republic, the number of German cartels significantly 
increased in the 1920s.27 From 1933, the emergent Nazi regime turned Weimar anti-
cartel legislation to its own purposes. The Economy Minister was given powers to make 
cartels compulsory,28 which played a significant role in ‘organising the Third Reich’s 
war effort’.29 
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3.3. Postwar Reconstruction 
During the final Allied invasion, the Americans brought a group of economists to assess 
industrial records and speak to captured industrial leaders.30 Many were strong 
proponents of antitrust, and were advocates of deconcentration and decartelisation in the 
American occupation administration after the war.31 In American politics there was 
widespread political concern that industrial concentration was a threat to democracy,32 
and great concern among occupation officials at the ease with which the Nazi regime had 
acquired hegemonic economic power through cartelisation.33 It provided a strong 
political impetus to decentralise economic power to prevent the future rise of 
totalitarianism.34 
 
Wells describes the postwar reconstruction of Germany as ‘perhaps the most ambitious 
social science experiment in world history’,35 and there was an initial lack of consensus. 
Evidently, the Treaty of Versailles had failed in its objective to prevent a Second World 
War, but Wells states 
‘Some argued that Versailles failed because it had not crushed German power once 
and for all. They usually considered Nazism the logical culmination of the German 
political, economic, and social systems and assumed that the only way to prevent 
another war was to keep Germany weak and to reorganise its society radically. Others 
considered Versailles too harsh, crippling Germany’s relatively pacific Weimar 
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Republic before it was firmly established and thereby opening the way for the Nazis. 
They generally attributed Nazism to the chaos spawned by the Great War and the 
Depression and assumed that prosperity and social order were the keys to a lasting 
peace.’36 
 
Proponents of ‘hard peace’ wished to return Germany to an agrarian economy. It was 
often a view held by advocates of a conciliatory approach to the Soviets, and had the 
major drawback of being unable to sustain Germany’s population.37 Proponents of ‘soft 
peace’ tended to greater suspicion of the Soviets, as ‘a prosperous, stable Germany 
would form a bulwark against communist expansion.’38 Ultimately, tensions between the 
Allied Zones led to the eventual breakdown of relations between the Americans and the 
Soviets,39 and ‘soft peace’ quickly became the accepted approach. American foreign 
policy viewed the Soviet encroachment across Eastern Europe as a greater threat than a 
resurgent Germany, and concluded a united Western Europe was the best defence 
against Communism. It is in this context that American support for European integration 
flourished.40 
 
American occupation officials aimed to promote ‘the introduction of laws and 
regulations safeguarding free competition to guarantee the sustainability of democratic 
governments in Western Europe.’41 The longstanding relationship between the US High 
Commissioner for Germany, Jack McCloy, and Jean Monnet, the architect of the 
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Schuman Declaration, was particularly significant.42 McCloy’s General Counsel, Robert 
Bowie, was a Harvard antitrust law professor whose work influenced the Declaration 
and the antitrust provisions in the subsequent European Coal and Steel Community 
Treaty.43 Robert Schuman himself, the French Foreign Minister, had discussed the 
Declaration with the US Ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson. Both were supporters of European integration as part of postwar 
reconstruction.44 The Declaration was made on 9th May 1950, with Schuman proposing 
‘that Franco-German production of coal and steel be placed under a common High 
Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the 
other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should 
immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic 
development as a first step in the federation of Europe…The solidarity in production 
thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany 
becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.’45  
 
The Declaration was a political solution under significant time pressure. Germany 
remained the most significant coal and steel producer in mainland Europe. The French 
perceived the postwar fuel shortage to have been exacerbated by the Germans charging 
higher prices to foreign consumers.46 A key French goal was securing its steel industry 
equal access to Ruhr coal as the German producers.47 The continuing deep suspicion of 
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French intentions among the German public was a barrier to progress.48 Securing the 
support of the increasingly autonomous West German government, therefore, was 
critical to the success of Schuman’s plan. However, he correctly suspected that, despite 
tensions, Chancellor Adenauer would react favourably to his proposal.49 Adenauer 
recalls in his memoirs that Schuman wrote to him frankly about the politics underlying 
the Declaration 
‘In his personal letter to me Schuman wrote that the purpose of his proposal was not 
economic, but eminently political. In France there was a fear that once Germany had 
recovered, she would attack France. He could imagine that the corresponding fears 
might be present in Germany. Rearmament always showed first in an increased 
production of coal, iron, and steel. If an organisation such as he was proposing were 
to be set up, it would enable each country to detect the first signs of rearmament, and 
would have an extraordinarily calming effect in France…Schuman’s plan 
corresponded entirely with the ideas I had been advocating for a long time concerning 
the integration of the key industries of Europe. I informed Robert Schuman at once 
that I accepted his proposal wholeheartedly.’50 
 
After the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community,51 there were several 
false starts towards further integration.52 Proponents of integration concluded the 
establishment of a Common Market was the best remaining route.53 The Spaak Report54 
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was published in 1956 and formed the basis for negotiating the Treaty of Rome which 
instituted the European Economic Community.55 The Spaak Report committed to 
including competition rules in the Treaty of Rome, stating 
‘Action against monopolies within the common market will be developed in 
conformity with the basic rules contained in the treaty. It will be limited to practices 
affecting interstate commerce which take the form of cartel organizations (ententes) 
and monopolies using discriminatory practices, dividing markets, limiting production 
and controlling the market for a particular product.’56 
 
The competition rules in the Treaty of Rome, then Articles 85 and 86, remain in force, 
textually unchanged, as Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
 
3.4. Influences on the development of the Community competition rules 
The academic influences on Community competition law begin with the Freiburg School 
of Economics, also known as Ordoliberalism. Gerber considers it the dominant influence 
on the foundation of Community competition law, and that its policy objectives 
‘suffused the process of European unification’.57 Ordoliberalism originated in the 
‘Freiburg Circles’, underground groups of anti-Nazi intellectuals. Freiburg’s great 
distance from the major urban centres and its intellectual tradition made it the ideal place 
for German intellectuals to circulate anti-Nazi ideas in relative safety during the Nazi 
period.58 
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Ordoliberal thought focuses on the role and power of the economy within society. The 
father of Ordoliberalism, Walter Eucken, is linked particularly closely to the concept of 
the ‘social market economy’ pioneered by Chancellor Adenauer’s government. It accepts 
certain classical liberal fundamentals such as the links between economic freedom and 
political freedom, but it differs significantly on the matter of private economic power.59  
Ordoliberals believed 
‘it was not sufficient to protect the individual from the power of government, because 
governments were not the only threat to individual freedom. Having witnessed the use 
of private economic power to destroy political and social institutions during the 
Weimar period, the ordoliberals emphasized the need to protect society from the 
misuse of such power. This meant that the state had to be strong enough to resist the 
influence of private power groups. In order for government officials to be in a 
position to create the structures of the new society, the government of which they 
were a part would have to be able to protect them against private influences.’60 
 
Most Ordoliberals supported the elimination of monopolies,61 but their conception of 
economic regulation was to establish structures rather than directing the ‘processes’ of 
the economy.62 Ordoliberals tended to consider cartels as aspects of monopolisation, 
considering that cartel members had the equivalent power to a unilateral monopoly.63 
Leonard Miksch, a student of Eucken’s, refined an ‘as-if’ standard of conduct for 
monopolists. Gerber states  
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‘divestiture would not be required, however, in cases of natural monopoly or where 
the monopoly position was based on a legally protected right (for example, a patent or 
copyright) or where divestiture would otherwise be impractical or entail economic 
waste. In such cases competition law was to provide a standard of conduct for such 
firms. It required that economically powerful firms act as if they were subject to 
competition – that is, as if they did not have such power.’64 
 
Eucken defines the objective of Ordoliberalism as ‘complete competition’, namely 
‘competition in which no firm in a market has power to coerce conduct by other firms in 
that market’.65 Cartels provide members with monopoly power ‘structurally inconsistent 
with the complete competition standard’.66 Pinar Akman criticises ‘complete 
competition’ as equivalent to an unattainable ‘perfect competition standard’.67 This 
supports the view that Community competition policy diverged from Ordoliberal 
objectives when it adopted the workable competition, or effective competition, 
objective.68 
 
While the Ordoliberals had operated underground during the Nazi period, they found 
themselves in a position of significant influence when Allied Occupation officials turned 
their mind to the postwar reform of Germany. They were well placed to support the 
Allies as  
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‘The US military government sought to develop an economic policy that would both 
minimize government economic planning and eliminate cartels, and members of the 
Freiburg School presented a coherent plan for achieving these goals. In addition, they 
were among the few qualified Germans who were not tainted by ties to Nazism, and 
thus they met the rigorous US denazification standards. As a result, many members of 
the group soon assumed leadership positions in German self-government.’69  
 
Both Chancellor Adenauer and his Economy Minister Ludwig Erhard had Ordoliberal 
affiliations. Erhard, a long-time adherent of the Freiburg School, was the architect of the 
‘German economic miracle’. In 1948, with the implicit support of US occupation 
officials, he took the radical step of eliminating rationing and price controls in West 
Germany. It began a decades-long period of sustained economic growth in Germany.70 
His conception of Ordoliberalism emphasises the importance of the consumer in addition 
to the standard ordoliberal objective of a structured economy, stating ‘The State must not 
decide who should be victorious in the market, nor should an industrial organization 
such as a cartel; it must be consumer alone’.71 
 
While Erhard was the key Ordoliberal figure in the domestic politics of West Germany, 
the Ordoliberals with the greatest impact on the development of competition law at 
Community level were Walter Hallstein and Hans von der Groeben, who led the West 
German delegation to the Treaty of Rome negotiations and subsequently became the first 
German Commissioners,72 with Von der Groeben the first Competition Commissioner. 
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Gerber considers that their influence held almost sole sway over the drafting of the 
principal competition rules, stating 
‘The structure of the two main competition law provisions of the Rome Treaty 
(Articles 85 and 86) also closely tracked ordoliberal thought and bore little 
resemblance to anything to be found in other European competition laws at the time. 
While the prohibition of cartel agreements had analogues in US antitrust law, the 
concept of prohibiting abuse of a market-dominating position was an important new 
development that was particularly closely associated with ordoliberal and German 
competition law thought and very different from the discourse of US law.’73 
[Emphasis added] 
 
The significance of Ordoliberal influence appears to be clear, notwithstanding some 
outsider viewpoints,74 but the somewhat hegemonic influence Gerber ascribes to it, to 
the exclusion of any other European influence,75 has been criticised.76 Advocates of a 
more multi-faceted interpretation respect the influence of Ordoliberalism but consider 
that Gerber’s view of Ordoliberal transposition from German law to Community law is 
too simplistic.77 
 
Pace and Seidel state that the final text of Article 85 was a compromise between French 
and German representatives. The Germans wanted the anti-cartel provision to be based 
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on the ‘principle of prohibition without exception’,78 while the French wished to retain 
the distinction present in their domestic law between good and bad agreements.79 They 
do note, however, that it was Von der Groeben who proposed the compromise 
construction that remains to this day – a provision prohibiting cartel agreements (85 (1) 
EEC, now 101 (1) TFEU), and a provision of conditions for declaring the prohibition 
inapplicable (85 (3) EEC, now 101 (3) TFEU).80 
 
The link between Ordoliberalism and the then Article 86 EEC, now Article 102 TFEU, 
is also unclear, principally because the Freiburg School had a far more developed 
position on cartels than they did on unilateral monopolies.81 While Gerber links abuse of 
dominance to Miksch’s ‘as-if’ standard,82 Heike Schweitzer notes that Eucken was in 
favour of the per se prohibition of monopolies except where unavoidable.83 
 
Following the Treaty of Rome, the development of Community competition policy 
became tied to the political factors influencing the work of the fledgling Commission. 
This was of particular significance for the drafting of Regulation 17/62, the principal 
implementing regulation of the competition rules.84 In DG IV, the Commission 
Directorate for Competition, there was a conflict of ideas between Ordoliberalism and 
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what Ramirez-Perez and Van de Scheur describe as ‘a ‘Keynesian’ discourse’.85 The 
latter, they claim, was characterised by favouring industrial and social policy objectives 
over pure protection of the process of competition, and greater tolerance than 
Ordoliberals had to ‘good’ cartels and industrial concentrations.86 The ‘Keynesian 
discourse’ reflected the French policy of planification, which characterised the French 
domestic economic policy of significant government intervention, including price 
controls, up until the 1970s.87 Von der Groeben considered that the negotiations with the 
Council to draft Regulation 17/62 were tense, and, and he was unsure at the time 
whether the Commission’s views would prevail.88 Relatively broad exemptions to the 
competition rules for the agricultural89 and transport90 sectors highlight a lack of 
enthusiasm by the Council for a consistent Ordoliberal position.91 
 
In 1961, the year before the passage of Regulation 17/62, Von der Groeben wrote in the 
EEC Bulletin that the developing Commission competition policy ‘must establish on the 
various markets of the Community a situation in which competition is neither distorted 
nor perverted’.92 Prevention of distortion of competition is written into the competition 
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rules,93 and it is consistent with the central tenet of Ordoliberalism, to prevent 
interference with the competitive process.94 While Schweitzer considers that the link 
between Ordoliberalism and Article 102 is unclear, she does consider that there is a clear 
link between both competition rules and the goal of market integration.95 Gerber 
maintains there is a link between Ordoliberal objectives and the market integration 
objective. He states 
‘The goal of European integration has been developed to counteract distortions of the 
competitive process associated with the existence of political borders within Europe. 
Where legal impediments such as intellectual property rights impede competition 
across borders within the European Union, the abuse provision has been used to assert 
the unity of the European market. The capacity of a dominant firm to use its market 
power to prevent competition across borders is seen as a potentially serious distortion 
of the competitive process, especially because it involves political borders and thus 
may implicate the enforcement powers of the state. The main point is that this goal 
derives from and applies the concept of competitive distortion, but here the goal is 
further defined by the specific context of the process of European integration.’96 
 
The emphasis on vertical restraints in early Community competition law enforcement is 
indicative of the status of market integration as the principal policy objective in the mid-
1960s. While horizontal cartels appear as the most obvious form of distortion of 
competition in a market, the Community identified that vertical agreements could be a 
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tool for market division. Private agreements maintaining the economic borders the 
Treaty sought to abolish were unacceptable.97 
 
In 1957, the German radio and television manufacturer Grundig appointed Consten as its 
exclusive distributor and aftermarket service provider in France. Grundig also prohibited 
all its other purchasers from exporting to France, granting Consten absolute exclusivity 
in selling Grundig products to the French market.98 In 1964, the Commission issued a 
Decision prohibiting the agreement.99 
 
The Commission omitted to include any economic impact assessment in determining 
whether the agreement affected trade between Member States, which indicated the 
overriding status of the market integration objective.100 The Decision states that a 
parallel import ban ‘tends to isolate the national markets and hinder their integration into 
the Common Market, and consequently is capable of affecting trade between Member 
States’.101 They rejected that the ban was indispensable to the agreement, and that its 
absence would unacceptably compromise Consten’s market position in France.102 The 
Decision concludes with a clear statement of the market integration objective, that 
‘Absolute territorial protection appears as particularly noxious to the realisation of the 
Common Market in making more difficult or in preventing the alignment of the market 
conditions of the products covered by the contract in the Common Market’103  
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The Court of Justice upheld the Commission decision, and stated their own commitment 
to the market integration objective thus 
‘an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the 
national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the 
most fundamental objections [sic] of the Community. The Treaty, whose preamble and 
content aim at abolishing the barriers between States, and which in several provisions 
gives evidence of a stern attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow 
undertakings to reconstruct such barriers. Article 101 (1) is designed to pursue this 
aim, even in the case of agreements between undertakings placed at different levels in 
the economic process.’104 [Emphasis added] 
 
The Court rejected that the Commission should have made an economic assessment of 
the agreement’s effect on trade between Member States, considering that it was clear the 
conditions of the agreement ‘indisputably’ affected trade.105 Critically, the Court rejected 
a need for an economic assessment if the agreement had the object of restricting 
competition as 
‘for the purpose of applying [Article 101 (1) TFEU], there is no need to take account 
of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. Therefore the absence in the 
contested decision of any analysis of the effects of the agreement on competition 
between similar products of different makes does not, of itself, constitute a defect in 
the decision.’106 
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Throughout the rest of the 1960s, the objective of market integration was clear in Court 
of Justice case law. The Italian challenge to Regulation No 19/65, the first Block 
Exemption Regulation,107 failed on the grounds that vertical agreements could distort 
competition for the purposes of Article 101.108 The Court emphasised that Article 101 
should be read in the context of the Treaty preamble, making particular reference to ‘the 
elimination of barriers’ considered ‘necessary for bringing about a single market’.109 
Völk focused on the question of foreseeability, holding ‘it must be possible to foresee 
with a sufficient degree of probability…that [an agreement] might hinder the attainment 
of the objectives of a single market between States’.110 In STM, an early case on 
agreements with the effect of distorting competition (as opposed to the object of 
distorting competition, in terms of Article 101), the Court stated 
‘it is necessary to consider in particular whether [an agreement] is capable of bringing 
about a partitioning of the market in certain products between Member States and thus 
rendering more difficult the interpenetration of trade which the Treaty is intended to 
create.’111 
 
During the 1960s the Commission focused its competition law enforcement entirely on 
Article 101; it did not issue an Article 102 decision until 1971.112 The initial focus on 
Article 101 was understandable. Pace references the need for the Commission to ensure 
private undertakings did not seek to resurrect the barriers they were aiming to 
eliminate.113  
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Von der Groeben was replaced as Competition Commissioner in 1967 by a Dutchman, 
Emmanuel Sassen, who did not share his Ordoliberal views.114 Sassen began to distance 
DG IV from Ordoliberalism and promoted what Ramirez-Perez and van de Scheur 
describe as the ‘Keynesian discourse’.115 His belief was that competition policy should 
not merely be about the protection of the competitive process, but should incorporate 
social and industrial policy goals, the latter including a focus on the competitiveness of 
European companies in the global market.116 
 
Ordoliberals, in particular Eucken, have been criticised for not distinguishing between 
ordoliberal complete competition and neoclassical perfect competition; Akman suggests 
they are to all intents and purposes the same.117 The move away from Ordoliberalism led 
to the increasing influence of the concept of workable competition in Community law 
(ironically, in the same decade its influence was decimated in the United States). This 
lead to the development of the effective competition objective. 
 
John Maurice Clark coined the term ‘workable competition’ in 1940, and his article 
‘Toward a Concept of Workable Competition’118 had significant influence on the 
Harvard School of Antitrust.119 Clark postulated that ‘perfect competition’ had never 
existed, and served as a poor model of analysis for the comparison of real competitive 
conditions.120 The Ordoliberal aim of complete competition or perfect competition was 
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thus an unachievable objective which disregarded the political realities that ultimately 
controlled the Commission. Marco-Colino draws the link between workable competition 
and the multi-faceted set of objectives that were promoted by Emmanuel Sassen in the 
early 1970s, stating 
‘The concept of workable competition leads to the view that competition policy is an 
integral part of the general economic policy strategy. This implies that it should serve 
the same goals as other disciplines of economic policy, which in turn favours a multi-
goal approach that can include economic and non-economic goals…This theory 
would serve to justify the multi-goal approach to the regulation of competition 
followed by early US antitrust and the EU competition policy even to date.’121  
 
The effective competition objective became evident in 1970s case law, particularly in the 
first Commission Decision and ECJ judgment on Article 102, Continental Can.122 The 
Continental Can Company had acquired a majority shareholding in the Dutch company 
TDV, which ‘had the effect of practically eliminating competition in…packaging 
products over a substantial part of the Common Market’.123 The Commission found the 
conduct to be an abuse of dominance.124 The Court of Justice upheld the Decision, 
stating the complementary purpose of the two competition rules thus 
‘[Articles 101 and 102 TFEU] seek to achieve the same aim on different levels, viz. 
the maintenance of effective competition within the Common Market. The restraint of 
competition which is prohibited if it is the result of behaviour falling under [Article 
101 TFEU], cannot become permissible by the fact that such behaviour succeeds 
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under the influence of a dominant undertaking and results in the merger of the 
undertakings concerned…Such a diverse legal treatment would make a breach in the 
entire competition law which could jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common 
Market.’125 [Emphasis added] 
 
The objective of market integration was not replaced by the objective of effective 
competition, but became ‘embedded’ in it.126 The Metro case indicated that a multi-
faceted set of objectives were being pursued under the umbrella of effective 
competition.127 The applicant wholesaler had requested to join SABA’s selective 
distribution network, but had been rejected.128 Their application to the Commission to 
have SABA’s distribution system declared incompatible with Article 101 was 
unsuccessful.129 The Court’s affirmation of the Decision demonstrates a concern not only 
for the competitive process, but also consumer welfare and small-business welfare, 
stating 
‘The powers conferred upon the Commission under [Article 101 (3) TFEU] show that 
the requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may be reconciled with 
the safeguarding of objectives of a different nature and that to this end certain 
restrictions on competition are permissible, provided that they are essential to the 
attainment of those objectives and that they do not result in the elimination of 
competition for a substantial part of the Common Market…For specialist wholesalers 
and retailers the desire to maintain a certain price level, which corresponds to the 
desire to preserve, in the interests of consumers, the possibility of the continued 
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existence of this channel of distribution…forms one of the objectives which may be 
pursued without necessarily failing under the prohibition contained in [Article 101 (1) 
TFEU]’130 [Emphasis added] 
 
There are echoes of Justice Peckham’s ‘slip’131 in Trans-Missouri, that a ‘mere reduction 
in the price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a 
class’.132 There is the kind of uncomfortable attempt to balance consumer welfare with 
small business welfare that led to the rise of the Chicago School in the United States, and 
influenced the eventual move to the ‘more economic approach’ in the European Union. 
 
The effective competition concept was also applied in the contemporaneous Article 102 
case of United Brands. The leading case on definition of the relevant market, it defines 
dominant position as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market’.133 
In fact, the effective competition approach gave rise to a substantial number of cases, 
essentially supporting the objectives of workable competition and preventing detriment 
to a variety of groups, including ‘the public interest, individual undertakings and 
consumers’.134 The Commission made its clearest statement of the effective competition 
objective in the 15th Report on Competition Policy. They state 
‘Effective competition provides a set of…checks and balances in the market economy 
system. It preserves the freedom and right of initiative of the individual economic 
operator and it fosters the spirit of enterprise. It creates an environment within which 
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European industry can grow and develop in the most efficient manner and at the same 
time take account of social goals. Competition policy should ensure that abusive use 
of market power by a few does not undermine the rights of the many; it should 
prevent artificial distortions and enable the market to stimulate European enterprise to 
innovate and to remain competitive on a global scale.’135 
 
3.5. The shift to the more economic approach 
In the 1990s, EU competition policy moved into a ‘third period’ in which it increased its 
focus on efficiency and consumer welfare objectives,136 often referred to as the ‘more 
economic approach’. The impetus for the more economic approach was sustained 
criticism of the Commission’s position on vertical restraints, particularly the view that 
‘it has taken an overly broad view of the prohibition in [Article 101 (1) TFEU], 
considering that any restriction on the freedom of action of contracting parties is 
prohibited by the provision and taking insufficient account of the economic context 
within which agreements operate.’137  
 
In its 1997 Green Paper, the Commission conceded that its policy had been to apply a 
broad interpretation of Article 101 (1) to vertical restraints, citing a concern for its effect 
on market integration.138 They stated that ‘vertical restraints are no longer regarded as 
per se suspicious or per se pro-competitive’, and emphasise the ‘importance of market 
structure in determining the impact of vertical restraints’.139 Importantly, they also state 
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vertical agreements have the potential to facilitate market integration and enhance 
efficiency and consumer welfare, while still recognising their potential to partition the 
single market.140 The Commission emphasised its focus on market structures, stating 
‘Anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints are likely to be insignificant in 
competitive markets. Rather their efficiency enhancing effect and benefit to 
consumers is likely to dominate. Anti-competitive effects are only likely where 
interbrand competition is weak and there are barriers to entry.’141 
 
The 1998 European Night Services case, before the General Court, altered the case law 
on vertical restraints.142 A joint subsidiary company had been incorporated by several 
national rail operators to provide sleeper services through the newly built Channel 
Tunnel. The Commission concluded the agreement engaged Article 101,143 but allowed 
it to proceed under the relevant Block Exemption Regulation,144 subject to significant 
conditions.145 In a bid to rid themselves of the restrictions, the applicant applied to the 
General Court for annulment of the Decision.146 They submitted that ‘none of the 
constituent elements of the conduct prohibited by [Article 101 (1) TFEU] is 
established…since the ENS agreements do not restrict competition’,147 and that potential 
benefits outweighed the alleged restrictions on competition.148 
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The Commission Decision had engaged a Block Exemption Regulation, and thus had not 
considered the agreement under Article 101 (3). The General Court rejected that they 
were required to balance the pro- and anti-competitive elements of an agreement when 
considering Article 101 (1),149 holding that was a test exclusive to Article 101 (3).150 
However, they held that ‘the Commission’s assessment is…based on an analysis of the 
market which does not correspond to the real situation’,151 and annulled the decision, 
finding the Commission had failed to demonstrate the agreement had restricted 
competition for the purposes of engaging Article 101 (1).152 It was a major change to the 
persistent hostility the Community Courts had shown toward vertical agreements.153 
 
The Commission’s ‘change of perspective can be perceived’154 in the revised Block 
Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements in 1999.155 The 1999 Regulation replaced 
a variety of previous regulations on specific categories of vertical agreements,156 and 
constituted ‘a single block exemption for these agreements that takes into consideration 
market power and that broadens considerably the scope of the exemption’.157 The 
Regulation was supplemented in 2000 by Commission Guidelines,158 which confirmed 
the Green Paper’s position that the Commission views the pro- and anti-competitive 
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nature of vertical restraints as being dependent on market structure, and specifically the 
strength of interbrand competition.159 The Guidelines stated 
‘The protection of competition is the primary objective of EC competition policy, as 
this enhances consumer welfare and creates an efficient allocation of resources. In 
applying the EC competition rules, the Commission will adopt an economic approach 
which is based on the effects of the market; vertical agreements have to be analysed in 
their legal and economic context.’160 
 
This revised competition policy has been described by Hildebrand as ‘more economic 
and less regulatory’161 and by Schweitzer as ‘significantly more permissive vis-à-vis 
vertical agreements’.162 Buttgieg stresses the move from black-listing and white-
listing,163 a legalistic format present in previous Block Exemption Regulations,164 to 
economic tests like market power threshold presumptions.165 
 
The 2004 Commission Guidelines on Article 101 (3) state that ‘the balancing of anti-
competitive and pro-competitive effects is conducted exclusively within the framework 
laid down by [Article 101 (3)]’.166 It was borne out of a concern to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of Article 101 (3) demanded by case law,167 but the drawback was that it 
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left significant ambiguity on what economic analysis should be incorporated into ‘object 
or effect’ determinations under Article 101 (1). 
 
The GlaxoSmithKline cases demonstrate this ambiguity. The pharmaceutical 
multinational submitted the General Court168 should annul the Commission Decision 
holding that their distribution network in Spain infringed Article 101.169 Considering the 
‘object or effect’ test in Article 101 (1), the General Court stated 
‘In effect, the objective assigned to [Article 101 (1) TFEU]…is to prevent 
undertakings, by restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, 
from reducing the welfare of the final consumers of the products in question…At the 
hearing, in fact, the Commission emphasised on a number of occasions that it was 
from that perspective that it had carried out its examination in the present case, 
initially concluding that the General Sales Conditions clearly restricted the welfare of 
consumers, then considering whether that restriction would be offset by increased 
efficiency which would itself benefit consumers.’170 
 
Buttgieg notes the General Court’s definition of ‘consumer’ is limited to ‘final 
consumer’, which is somewhat more restrictive than the usual definition of ‘any user’.171 
Werden considers that, while consumer welfare is not the test for legality under Article 
101 (1), it provides, when considered, economic indicators that there is restriction of 
competition.172 Such economic analysis is a standard element of assessing whether an 
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agreement has the effect of restricting competition, but the General Court went further 
and stated that there should be economic analysis when assessing whether an agreement 
has the object of restricting competition 
‘Consequently, the application of [Article 101 (1) TFEU] to the present case cannot 
depend solely on the fact that the agreement in question is intended to limit parallel 
trade in medicines or to partition the common market, which leads to the conclusion 
that it affects trade between Member States, but also requires an analysis designed to 
determine whether it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition on the relevant market, to the detriment of the final consumer.’173 
 
The ECJ demonstrated resistance to the more economic approach the General Court had 
supported. They overturned the General Court judgment, considering that they 
misinterpreted the textual construction of Article 101 (1) 
‘it must be borne in mind that the anti-competitive object and effect of an agreement 
are not cumulative but alternative conditions for assessing whether such an agreement 
comes within the scope of the prohibition laid down in [Article 101 (1) TFEU] …the 
alternative nature of that condition, indicated by the conjunction ‘or’, leads first to the 
need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in 
which it is to be applied. Where, however, the analysis of the content of the agreement 
does not reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition, the consequences of the 
agreement should then be considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition it is 
necessary to find that those factors are present which show that competition has in 
fact been prevented, restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent. It is also apparent 
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from the case-law that it is not necessary to examine the effects of an agreement once 
its anti-competitive object has been established.’174 
 
While the Court preferred a more restrictive construction of Article 101 (1), it did not 
wholly reject an economic approach to it. It appears from its comments on ‘precise 
purpose’ in the ‘economic context’ to be following the approach in European Night 
Services.175 The Court may have adopted the view Gregory Werden advocated, that 
‘‘consumer welfare’ should not be used as a test and should be used only sparingly as 
guide because the focus should be on the competitive process itself’.176 
 
The application of the consumer welfare objective to Article 102 has also suffered from 
ambiguity. In 2009, the Commission issued Guidance on their ‘enforcement 
priorities’.177 Within the Guidance Notice, the Commission stated 
‘The aim of the Commission’s enforcement activity in relation to exclusionary 
conduct is to ensure that dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition 
by foreclosing their competitors in an anti-competitive way, thus having an adverse 
impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would 
have otherwise prevailed or in some other form such as limiting quality or reducing 
consumer choice.’178 
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Lovdahl-Gormsen considers that the Discussion Paper179 that preceded the Guidance 
hinted at disagreement within the Commission. 180 The Guidance is not a statement of the 
Commission’s interpretation of the law, as Commission Guidelines are.181 Lovdahl-
Gormsen’s criticism is that enforcement priorities are, properly defined, a statement of 
how the Commission will focus resources, and the Guidance is in fact de facto 
substantive guidelines proffering a legal interpretation that ignores aspects of established 
case law.182  
 
The British Airways case demonstrated the Court’s scepticism of introducing a consumer 
welfare element to the enforcement of Article 102.183 The Commission Decision had 
ruled the financial incentives in British Airways’ travel agency commission system 
infringed Article 102.184 British Airways submitted to the ECJ that the General Court 
‘erred in law by disregarding evidence that BA’s commissions had no material effect on 
its competitors’,185 and ‘by failing to consider whether there was ‘prejudice to 
consumers’ under subparagraph (b)186 of the second paragraph of [Article 102 
TFEU]’.187 The Court dealt with the first plea by affirming the General Court’s 
position,188 stating that 
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‘according to consistent case law, for a practice to constitute an abuse, it is sufficient 
to demonstrate that there is a risk of it restraining competition, without there being 
any need to prove that it actually produced that effect.’189 
 
In considering ‘consumer prejudice’, the ECJ essentially followed Continental Can190 in 
holding that Article 82 covered a variety of practices, not only those which cause direct 
consumer detriment, but also those which undermine effective competition.191 It did not, 
however, reject a consumer welfare objective. The General Court had stated that finding 
an Article 102 infringement 
‘does not require it to be demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual or 
direct effect on consumers. Competition law concentrates upon protecting the market 
structure from artificial distortions because by doing so the interests of the consumer 
in the medium to long term are best protected.’192 
 
Werden suggests that this indicates ‘‘consumer welfare’ is a goal of Article 102’ but 
‘effects on ‘consumer welfare’ are not the test for legality’.193 He tends to rely on the 
assumption that short-term consumer welfare is not a relevant objective, and that 
effective competition will always enhance long-term consumer welfare. Schweitzer 
considers that British Airways’ conduct ‘constituted an abuse due to its potential to 
exclude competitors’, and states the Court’s conceptualisation of competition policy, 
based on effective and undistorted competition, ‘remains a main source of discontent’. 
She advocates Treaty revision to refer explicitly to a consumer welfare objective as a 
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replacement of, or (at least), an accompaniment to the current effective competition 
objectives.194 
 
EU competition policy has made an uneasy attempt to reconcile consumer welfare and 
efficiency objectives with the objectives of effective competition. Lovdahl-Gormsen 
cites a ‘serious conflict between economic freedom and consumer welfare’. She 
considers that one must be careful not to equate a greater number of competing 
undertakings with an increase in consumer welfare.195 Lovdahl-Gormsen sees the 
protection of the competitive process as the means of achieving an objective, rather than 
an objective in itself, but states 
‘protecting the competitive process can enhance consumer welfare in the long run. 
However, this is only if the competitive process is protected instrumentally…to 
achieve consumer welfare…ordoliberalism protects the competitive process to 
achieve economic freedom.’196 
 
More recently, the Court has indicated that it will no longer uphold the competitive 
process to protect less efficient competitors. In Danish Post, they dealt with the effect of 
unilateral exclusionary conduct, stating  
‘not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition…Competition 
on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the 
marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to 
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consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or 
innovation.’197 
3.6. Conclusions 
In contrast to US antitrust policy, the development of European competition policy has 
been characterised by gradual shifts rather than revolutions in thinking. The current 
policy objectives have been developed by a differing set of influences. Ordoliberalism 
was the earliest influence, which focused on the individual freedom to compete and the 
promotion of undistorted competition. In the context of the European project, it was 
closely associated with the market integration objective. As the influence of 
Ordoliberalism was challenged in the Commission by ‘Keynesian discourse’, market 
integration and freedom to compete became parts of the multi-faceted objectives of 
promoting effective competition, which also included promoting the wider social and 
industrial policy objectives of the Community. 
 
Finally, there has been the incorporation of the more economic approach. The additional 
consumer welfare objectives have not comprehensively replaced the existing objectives 
derived from earlier influences. However, they have come into conflict with the existing 
objectives, and their introduction has not been without ambiguity or tension. While they 
now form part of the set of objectives European competition policy espouses, a 
comprehensive method for balancing of the several objectives against each other remains 
to be realised.
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CHAPTER 4. COMPARATIVE LEGALITY OF THE HARDCORE VERTICAL 
RESTRICTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
The schools of thought that operate in antitrust demonstrate little divergence on their 
treatment of horizontal cartels. Except in limited circumstances manifestly 
anticompetitive, horizontal market division and price fixing agreements are treated in the 
US as per se illegal and in the EU as having the object of restricting competition. By 
contrast, the debate over the economic effects and appropriate legal treatment of vertical 
agreements has been far more controversial. Much of this debate has focused on the 
treatment of the so-called ‘hardcore restrictions’; respectively, the most comprehensively 
restrictive vertical nonprice restraint, absolute territorial protection (ATP), and the most 
restrictive vertical price restraint, minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). 
 
The US case law has made significant moves away from per se illegality for the 
hardcore restrictions since the 1970s.1 Under the influence of the Chicago School, which 
advocated per se legality for all vertical agreements,2 the Supreme Court repealed per se 
illegality for ATP in 1977,3 and for minimum RPM in 2007.4 
  
By contrast, the EU position of de facto per se illegality for the hardcore restrictions is 
very unlikely to change, despite the incorporation of welfare objectives into EU 
competition law.5 The early Court of Justice cases on vertical restraints confirmed they 
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engaged Article 101 (1),6 which has not been disputed since.7 Subject to no economic 
analysis under Article 101 (1), any scope for the hardcore restrictions fulfilling the 
conditions of Article 101 (3) has been wholly rejected by the Commission, and 
‘it seems most unlikely that the ECJ could, more radically, be persuaded, as Leegin 
persuaded the Supreme Court, that either restraint is no longer a suitable candidate for 
‘object’ analysis.’8 
 
This Chapter will begin with a comparative assessment of the development of the legal 
positions on ATP and minimum RPM in the US and EU. It will then critique the wider 
legal and economic debates on the effect of the hardcore restrictions, including the true 
extent of the free riding problem. It will also assess alternative antitrust policy positions 
on price and service competition, and interbrand and intrabrand competition. The 
Chapter will conclude with whether the US and EU’s legal positions on the hardcore 
restrictions withstand logical scrutiny within their own metrics of policy objectives.  
 
4.2. Comparative treatment of Absolute Territorial Protection 
The standard for per se illegality in US antitrust is articulated in the Northern Pacific 
case.9 Its rationale was to provide legal certainty and avoid complex and wasteful 
economic analysis of patently anticompetitive agreements.10 Justice Black stated 
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‘there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.’11 
 
White Motor was the first case to consider vertical territorial restrictions under the 
Northern Pacific standard.12 The White Motor Company argued their vertical restraints 
were necessary for the company to penetrate new markets and challenge more 
established manufacturers, and thus promoted interbrand competition.13 They also 
argued their network of distributors was more efficient than vertically integrating 
distribution.14 However, the Court was ambivalent about how to treat vertical territorial 
restraints. Justice Douglas concluded that further inquiry into their economic effects was 
required,15 and the Court ultimately made no statement on whether ATP should be per se 
illegal.16 
 
As such, when Schwinn came before the Supreme Court in 1967, there was no precedent 
for treating ATP as per se illegal in US antitrust.17 The lower courts had subjected 
vertical territorial restrictions to a rule of reason between White Motor and Schwinn.18 
The US Government had invited the court to find Schwinn’s restrictions illegal under the 
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rule of reason;19 neither party advocated per se illegality for ATP.20 The judgment, 
making no reference to the Northern Pacific standard, declared ATP per se illegal,21 and 
it was extensively criticised.22 The Court rejected an efficiency defence when it stated 
‘Schwinn sought a better way of distributing its product: a method which would 
promote sales, increase stability of its distributor and dealer outlets, and augment 
profits. But this argument, appealing as it is, is not enough to avoid the Sherman Act 
proscription; because, in a sense, every restrictive practice is designed to augment the 
profit and competitive position of its participants.’23 
 
Schwinn’s stated objective of protecting small businesses by preventing vertical 
integration of distribution had the opposite effect to the one it intended. The case 
encouraged extensive vertical integration by large manufacturers, including Schwinn 
itself, eliminating numerous small distributors.24 
 
Bork had been critical of the breadth of per se illegality rules since White Motor,25 and 
he had advocated per se illegality for all vertical agreements except those concealing 
horizontal manufacturer or dealer cartels.26 Chicagoan ideas gained traction post-
Schwinn, and the lower courts quickly became openly mutinous.27 Adolph Coors, which 
dealt with the specialised distribution of beer, is a case in point. The 10th Circuit applied 
Schwinn with deep reluctance, and stated the Supreme Court should reconsider it 
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‘Although we are compelled to follow the Schwinn per se rule rendering Coors’ 
territorial restrictions on resale illegal per se, we believe that the per se rule should 
yield to situations where a unique product requires territorial restrictions to remain in 
business. For example, speed of delivery, quality control of the product, refrigerated 
delivery, and condition of the Coors product at the time of delivery may justify 
restraints on trade that would be unreasonable when applied to marketing standardised 
products…Perhaps the Supreme Court may see the wisdom of grafting an exception 
to the per se rule when a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify its 
territorial restraints under the rule of reason.’28 
 
In 1975, Donald Baker advocated a shift from per se illegality to presumptive 
illegality,29 providing exceptions for specialised distribution and manufacturers seeking 
to penetrate new markets.30 This would have allowed the decision the 10th Circuit had 
desired in Adolph Coors, and prevented the need for the 3rd Circuit to circumvent 
Schwinn so inventively in their ruling on distribution with health and safety implications 
in Tripoli.31 Sylvania, however, embraced Chicagoan arguments and did away with the 
need for any such tentative steps. 
 
Sylvania came before the Supreme Court on appeal against another circumventive lower 
court attempt to distinguish Schwinn; the 9th Circuit had held a distribution network 
permitting only approved retail locations was a distinct proposition from territorial 
restrictions.32 The petitioners argued vertical restraints with the effect of eliminating 
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intrabrand competition could not be excused because of demonstrable procompetitive 
benefits to interbrand competition,33 and invited the Court to apply the Schwinn per se 
rule.34 
 
The respondents submitted that the Court should repeal the per se illegality of ATP, 
which carried significant weight in the context of numerous lower court decisions 
attempting to dodge Schwinn and extensive academic criticism.35 Justice Powell stated 
Schwinn had made an ‘abrupt and largely explained departure from White Motor’,36 and 
had failed to consider explicitly the Northern Pacific standard.37 He indicated that he 
doubted that the per se illegality of ATP was justified under Northern Pacific by stating 
‘The market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a 
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand 
competition.38 
 
Justice Powell appends this statement with a significant and oft cited footnote, stating 
that ‘interbrand competition…is the primary concern of antitrust law’, and ‘the degree of 
intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand competition’.39 
He accepted the respondent’s arguments that vertical territorial restrictions ‘which limit 
intrabrand competition will presumably serve to increase distributional efficiency’,40 and 
thereby increase interbrand competition, whatever the effect on intrabrand competition.41 
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The wholesale rejection of Schwinn was apparent in Powell’s description of potential 
efficiencies, stating 
‘new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions 
in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment 
in capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to 
the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in 
promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the 
efficient marketing of their products.’42 
 
The Sylvania ruling subjected all vertical nonprice restraints including ATP to the rule of 
reason.43 It was welcomed broadly by the Chicago School,44 subject to their continued 
advocacy for similar changes for minimum RPM,45 and ultimately for per se legality for 
all vertical restraints.46 While the Chicagoan ascendancy in the following decade was 
criticised extensively, sceptics of Chicago largely have accepted Sylvania.47 
 
Significant criticism coalesced around the structuring of a rule of reason for vertical 
nonprice restraints. Posner argued the Court’s omission in Sylvania to structure a new 
rule of reason left standing the definition articulated by Justice Brandeis in Chicago 
Board of Trade,48 which he considers deficient.49 Marco-Colino’s view is the emphasis 
on market power definitions created a situation that ‘almost advocates for the per se 
legality for non-price verticals imposed by firms with lack of significant market 
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power’.50 However, it is clear that Sylvania will remain the consistent legal position on 
ATP under the Sherman Act. 
 
The EU has not only taken an opposing position on ATP, but has held it consistently 
since the earliest Court of Justice case law. In Consten and Grundig, the Court was 
presented with a profound fork on the road in defining what economic assessment, if 
any, was required to find an agreement had as its ‘object…the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition’.51 The initial Commission decision interpreted Article 101 (1) 
as holding an agreement with ‘object’ status was per se illegal unless exempted under 
Article 101 (3), stating 
‘the finding that the parties to the contracts have intended Consten to be freed from 
the competition of other importers for the import and wholesale distribution of the 
Grundig products in France is enough for the conclusion that competition is restricted 
within the meaning of [Article 101 (1) TFEU].’52 
 
Advocate General Roemer proposed a different approach, more like the US position at 
the time (Consten and Grundig fell chronologically between White Motor and Schwinn). 
He stated 
‘American law (the ‘White Motor Case’) requires for situations of the type before us a 
comprehensive examination of their economic repercussions. Clearly I do not mean to 
say that we should imitate in all respects the principles of American procedure in the 
field of cartels...But such a reference is useful nevertheless in so far as it shows that in 
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respect of [Article 101 (1)] also it is not possible to dispense with observing the 
market in concreto…It seems to me wrong to have regard to such observation only for 
the application of [Article 101 (3)] because that paragraph requires an examination 
from other points of view which are special and different.’53 
 
The Court held no economic analysis was required to condemn agreements with the 
object of restricting competition,54 which has made ATP per se illegal since that time, 
almost without further challenge.55 While the Commission concedes that no agreement 
can be incapable of exemption in principle,56 ATP clauses are ‘black clauses’57 under the 
Block Exemption Regulation (BER);58 absolutely prohibited regardless of either party’s 
market share. The Commission dismisses the possibility that either they or the Court 
would ever find an ATP clause permissible under 101 (3).59 
 
Subsequent case law and decisions have considered parallel imports a red line to protect 
the market integration objective.60 In Nungesser, the Court accepted that exclusive 
dealerships or licensing within a territory could be permissible under Article 101, 
provided there was no prohibition on parallel imports.61 Where parties have submitted 
that ATP is necessary for distributive efficiency, it has been rejected by the Commission 
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on the grounds that it would be less restrictive of competition for the manufacturer to 
assume certain functions instead.62 The Commission has also condemned undertakings 
that have taken action with the effect of creating ATP, such as buying back excess 
stock.63 
 
Even the more economic approach has not shifted the overriding concern for market 
integration in more recent Commission decisions. Since the introduction of the 1999 
BER,64 the Commission has censured agreements stipulating larger deposits for sales 
outside distributor territories to restrict parallel imports;65 and restrictions on passive 
sales of products with critical downstream markets.66 As such, it is clear the EU’s 
absolute prohibition of ATP remains rooted in its market integration objective. The 
Commission’s Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP) observed it 
would otherwise be hard to justify, stating 
‘If the treatment of clauses which try to enforce territorial protection was based on 
pure economic efficiency grounds only, therefore, it would be difficult to argue for 
their per se prohibition (or of clauses which try to enforce it). But in EC competition 
law, there is not only the objective of economic efficiency but also that of promotion 
of market integration. According to this fundamental objective of the Treaty, goods 
should be free to circulate in the Common Market: clauses which aim to restricting 
the free movement of goods among Member States should therefore be prohibited.’67 
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The EAGCP advocated a de minimis rule for ATP agreements between parties without 
significant market power, to introduce some compromise between the established market 
integration objective and the newer efficiency objectives.68 The suggestion was not 
adopted in the redrafted BER in 2010.69 The ‘strong preoccupation’70 with market 
integration could not be wholly overridden, and it remains the case that ATP clauses can 
never benefit from market share threshold exemptions, either as a matter of Commission 
policy71 or EU law.72 
 
4.3. Comparative treatment of minimum Resale Price Maintenance 
The per se rule against minimum RPM in US antitrust had substantially greater 
longevity than its ATP counterpart. The Dr Miles case in 1911 concerned a medicine 
manufacturer who imposed a network of minimum RPM agreements on its distributors.73 
The Supreme Court held it should be condemned as per se illegal on two grounds, 
firstly, the supposedly ancient principle that ‘a general restraint upon alienation is 
ordinarily invalid’,74 and secondly that  
‘in the maintenance of fixed retail prices…the complainant can fare no better with its 
plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a 
combination and endeavoured to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve 
the same result, by agreement with each other.’75 
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The first rationale can be instantly disregarded. It has been ‘aptly ridiculed as “the 
solution given three or four hundred years ago by an English judge who was talking 
about something else.”’.76 The proposition that minimum RPM is equivalent to a 
horizontal dealer cartel is now largely rejected,77 though whether it can facilitate 
horizontal manufacturer or dealer cartels is more controversial.78 
 
Following Sylvania, Bork described the Dr Miles rule as ‘not only at war with sound 
antitrust policy but…decidedly peculiar even on its own terms’.79 Its position was 
certainly compromised by clumsy exceptions created in Colgate80 and General 
Electric.81 In 1960, the Court had overruled the Colgate refusal to deal exception in 
Parke, Davis, censuring a drug manufacturer who cut off distributors who did not sell at 
catalogue price.82 A further complication was the Miller-Tydings Act,83 a Depression-era 
statute granting states the right to legalise minimum RPM. Congress repealed Miller-
Tydings in 1975.84 In Sylvania, the Court were careful to state they were not making any 
change in the law of minimum RPM  
‘As in Schwinn, we are concerned here only with nonprice vertical restrictions. The 
per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years and 
involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy…some commentators 
have argued that the manufacturer’s motivation for imposing vertical price restrictions 
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may be the same as for nonprice restrictions. There are, however, significant 
differences that could easily justify different treatment. In his concurring opinion in 
White Motor Co v United States, Mr Justice Brennan noted that, unlike nonprice 
restrictions, “(r)esale price maintenance is not only designed to, but almost invariably 
does in fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected product, 
but quite as much between that product and competing brands”.’85 
 
Bork, taking his usual approach to obiter inconvenient to Chicagoan thought, stated the 
‘reservations may be viewed either as unfortunate wafflings or as judicious concessions 
necessary either to put together a majority or guard against unforeseen situations’.86  
Chicagoan pressure to reconsider the per se rule against minimum RPM took the form of 
both academic criticism87 and Reagan administration judicial appointments. Bork, 
Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook were all confirmed as federal judges between 
1981 and 1985.88 
 
Posner argued the divergent positions on per se illegality ‘warp[ed] the judicial approach 
to nonprice restrictions’,89 which was powerfully demonstrated by the 1st Circuit Wild 
Heerbrugg case.90 Wild’s assigned dealer for the state of Rhode Island was free to set its 
own prices within Rhode Island, but had to obey a minimum list price for sales out of 
state.91 The 1st Circuit was therefore in the unusual position of being compelled to 
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condemn an agreement with a less restrictive effect than ATP because it had minimum 
RPM elements.92 Posner considered 
‘If the defendant in the Eastern Scientific case had imposed an absolute prohibition on 
sales outside of a dealer’s territory, that would have been tantamount to setting a 
minimum resale price of infinity. By instead allowing dealers to sell outside of their 
territories at list price, the defendant in effect reduced that infinite price to a finite 
price at which some sales occurred, and thus increased the amount of intrabrand price 
competition in its product. In these circumstances, to allow the territorial restriction 
but prohibit the resale price provision would be perverse indeed.’93 
 
The flaw in Posner’s argument is that a reasonable application of the rule of reason 
would be to condemn an ATP clause that facilitated minimum RPM outside the assigned 
territory. Wild could explicitly assign dealers to, say, the tiny states of Rhode Island and 
Delaware, with the purpose of thus effectively fixing minimum prices by granting those 
dealers de facto exclusivity over the nearby and much larger states of New York and 
Pennsylvania. Ultimately, the 1st Circuit rejected that the agreement constituted 
minimum RPM,94 and the Supreme Court declined to clarify the matter, refusing to 
certify an appeal.95 
 
Monsanto96 was indicative of the process by which Dr Miles was ‘defanged’.97 It 
reversed Parke, Davis98 and reaffirmed the Colgate doctrine99 ‘as if it had never been 
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questioned and its distinction of Dr Miles made sense’.100 The Court in Sharp101 
indicated its struggle to find a principled distinction between vertical nonprice and price 
restraints.102 And in Khan,103 the Court reversed the per se illegality of maximum 
RPM.104 
 
However, the Leegin case presented the court with the clearest opportunity to reconsider 
Dr Miles.105 It was undisputed that the agreement constituted minimum RPM,106 and the 
petitioner submitted the Court should reverse the per se rule.107 Their submissions stated 
‘The per se rule against resale price maintenance established in Dr Miles squarely 
conflicts with this Court’s modern antitrust jurisprudence, which limits the use of per 
se rules to practices that “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output”108…Like all other vertical agreements, the validity of resale price 
maintenance agreements should be determined on a case-by-case basis under the rule 
of reason – rather than under a rigid per se rule – because economic analysis 
demonstrates that such agreements often have substantial procompetitive effects.’109 
 
The embedded quotation from Sharp, per Justice Scalia,110 was a clear indication of 
Chicagoan influence in the petitioner’s case. Scalia’s articulation of a standard for per se 
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illegality is not a wholesale departure from Northern Pacific,111 but it is articulated in 
Chicagoan language of efficiency and output,112 rather than in the terms of an antitrust 
policy focused on protecting the process of competition. Antitrust policy with the latter 
focus is sceptical of RPM because of the effects such agreements can have on price 
flexibility, a critical element of dynamic markets.113 This leads to the conclusion that the 
Court chose to overrule Dr Miles because it accepted Chicagoan metrics. 
 
Briefs for the Petitioner114 and the Bush Administration115 both attempt to focus the 
Court’s attention exclusively on the economic effect minimum RPM has on interbrand 
competition. They also emphasise the efficiencies and consumer welfare benefits derived 
from the promotion of services and market penetration minimum RPM can facilitate. 
 
The respondent was forced to articulate that ‘Dr Miles could be right…for the wrong 
reasons’,116 and submitted that the objective of antitrust policy should be the promotion 
of low prices for consumers.117 The Miller-Tydings Act had provided a natural 
experiment which had shown consumer goods had had significantly higher prices in ‘fair 
trade’ states, where minimum RPM had been legal.118 The respondent’s authorities are 
rooted in competitive process objectives, and variously describe price competition and 
flexibility as ‘the central nervous system of the economy’,119 ‘the very essence of 
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competition’,120 and inherent to ‘well-functioning competitive markets’.121 The 
respondent’s articulation of a price competition objective is understandable, as the Court 
in Sylvania considered the divergent effect on price competition the distinguishing 
feature between ATP and minimum RPM.122 
 
The Court ultimately overruled Dr Miles by a 5 to 4 majority,123 subjecting minimum 
RPM to a rule of reason standard.124 Justice Kennedy justifies his majority opinion by 
reference to the free riding problem and stimulation of interbrand competition arguments 
that were decisive in Sylvania.125 He goes further and suggests there will be 
circumstances where minimum RPM could be permissible even in the absence of a free 
riding problem.126 Justice Breyer’s dissent was surprisingly strong,127 criticising the 
failure to structure a rule of reason adequate for minimum RPM and their reliance as 
gospel on the free riding problem. He asks 
‘How easily can courts identify instances in which the benefits are likely to outweigh 
potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily. For one thing, it is often difficult 
to identify who – producer or dealer – is the moving force behind any given resale 
price maintenance agreement. Suppose, for example, several large multibrand retailers 
all sell resale-price maintained products. Suppose further that small producers set 
retail prices because they fear that, otherwise, the large retailers will favour (say, by 
allocating better shelf space) the goods of other producers who practice resale price 
maintenance…Who “initiated” this practice, the retailers hoping for considerable 
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insulation from retail competition, or the producers, who simply seek to deal best with 
the circumstances they find? For another thing, as I just said, it is difficult to 
determine just when, and where, the “free riding” problem is serious enough to 
warrant legal protection.’128 
 
The lack of a structured rule of reason in the majority opinion is the focus of much of the 
academic criticism of Leegin. A similar problem was created by Sylvania, where ‘in 
practice the rule of reason operates as a rule of de facto per se legality’.129 Lambert notes 
the FTC favoured a presumptive illegality rule that 
‘would deem any instance of RPM presumptively illegal unless the defendant proved: 
(1) that RPM is not used by manufacturers collectively comprising a significant share 
of the relevant product market; (2) that the manufacturer, not its dealers, initiated the 
RPM; and (3) that there is no dominant manufacturer or dealer with market power. 
These are three factors the Leegin Court emphasised as relevant to the question of 
whether a particular instance of RPM is pro- or anticompetitive, and the FTC 
reasoned that the defendant should have the burden of proving the nonexistence of 
each.’130 
 
Lambert criticises the FTC’s approach as too likely to condemn minimum RPM clauses, 
which he asserts are more often pro- than anticompetitive.131 Those who are more 
sceptical also favour presumptive illegality but with well structured ‘safe harbour’ 
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exceptions;132 principally for cases where undertakings lack market power or are 
attempting to penetrate a new market.133 
 
The EU position, that minimum RPM is a hardcore restriction, now stands in contrast to 
the US policy. While the EU has a wealth of case law and Commission decisions on 
ATP, the EU’s treatment of minimum RPM is relatively sparse. This is due to the 
significance illegal territorial restrictions played during the early period of the 
Community, when competition policy had the near-exclusive objective of market 
integration.  
 
Outside of the context of minimum RPM, statements on price competition were first 
articulated in the 1970s when the Commission diversified the objectives of Community 
competition policy to include the protection of effective competition. In Metro, the Court 
stated that ‘price competition is so important that it can never be eliminated’.134 When 
the Court directly considered vertical price fixing in the selective distribution case of 
Binon, it upheld the Commission’s view that 
‘any price-fixing agreement constitutes, of itself, a restriction on competition and is, 
as such, prohibited by [Article 101 (1)]. The Commission does not deny that 
newspapers and periodicals and the way they are distributed have special 
characteristics but considers that these cannot lead to an exclusion of such products 
and their distribution from the scope of [Article 101 (1)]. On the contrary, those 
characteristics should be put forward by the undertakings relying upon them in the 
context of an application for exemption under [Article 101 (3)].’135 
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The subsequent Pronuptia case drew the distinction between illegal vertical price 
restrictions and permissible price recommendations in the context of franchising 
agreements.136 The Court affirmed this position more recently in Pedro IV, finding that 
recommended resale prices for fuel, calculated on an assumed distributor’s margin, were 
not illegal if they were genuinely a recommendation.137 A fixed distribution margin, by 
contrast, would have the same economic effect as minimum RPM.  
 
The 1999 BER listed minimum RPM as a hardcore restriction not capable of 
exemption.138 Despite speculation that the Leegin judgment would encourage changes in 
Commission policy,139 the legal position on minimum RPM was unchanged by the 2010 
BER.140 As with ATP, the EAGCP advocated for market power tests, rooted in welfare 
economics, for minimum RPM agreements; a de minimis presumptive legality approach 
for undertakings with under 15% of market share, a burden to prove procompetitive 
benefits on undertakings with between 15% and 30% of market share, and presumptive 
illegality for undertakings with greater market power.141 
 
The rejection of the EAGCP’s recommendation has been criticised. Vettas considers that 
anticompetitive effects are unlikely to be realised unless the undertakings involved have 
substantial market power.142 Jones states the Commission accepts minimum RPM can 
have procompetitive benefits under specific circumstances but nonetheless subjects it to 
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‘object’ status.143 Kneepkens criticises the inconsistency with the Commission’s 
commitment to the more economic approach.144 
 
While the EU maintained its position on minimum RPM in the 2010 BER despite 
apparent pressure,145 the Commission was compelled to increase its stated 
justifications.146 The 2000 Guidelines cite the principal anticompetitive effects of RPM 
as ‘(1) a reduction in intra-brand price competition, and (2) increased transparency on 
prices’.147 The 2010 Guidelines list a rather more extensive set of anticompetitive effects 
‘Firstly, RPM may facilitate collusion between suppliers by enhancing price 
transparency…Second, by eliminating intra-brand price competition, RPM may also 
facilitate collusion between the buyers…Third, RPM may more generally soften 
competition between manufacturers and/or between retailers, in particular when 
manufacturers use the same distributors…Fourth, the immediate effect of RPM will 
be that all or certain distributors are prevented from lowering their sales price for that 
particular brand. Fifth, RPM may lower the pressure on the margin of the 
manufacturer…Sixth, RPM may be implemented by a manufacturer with market 
power to foreclose smaller rivals. The increased margin that RPM may offer 
distributors, may entice the latter to favour the particular brand over rival brands when 
advising customers, even where such advice is not in the interest of these 
customers…Lastly, RPM may reduce dynamism and innovation at the distribution 
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level. By preventing price competition between different distributors, RPM may 
prevent more efficient retailers from entering the market…’148 
 
4.4. Free Riding and Provision of Services under Vertical Restraints 
It is undisputed that free riding exists in any economy. In what circumstances the law 
should intervene to correct a free-riding problem has become a critical question for 
antitrust policy, because the scope of the theory is of fundamental importance in 
assessing whether vertical restraints are pro- or anticompetitive. In Sylvania, Justice 
Powell states vertical restrictions can be justified because under 
market imperfections such as the so-called “free rider” effect…services might not be 
provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each 
retailer’s benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if none did.’149  
 
Marco-Colino considers the Sylvania position weak when it is used to justify vertical 
restraints to prevent free riding on established manufacturers, who are likely to have 
lower promotional costs and greater market power.150 The Commission carefully limits 
its scope of recognition of free rider issues in the 2010 Guidelines, stating that 
‘For there to be a problem, there needs to be a real free-rider issue. Free-riding 
between buyers can only occur on pre-sales services and other promotional activities, 
but not on after-sales services for which the distributor can charge its customers 
individually.’151 
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Warren Grimes criticises Sylvania for failing to take the same position on after-sales 
services.152 He considers it a ‘broad-brush’ departure from the refined free-rider theory 
first postulated by Lester Telser in 1960.153 The sheer breadth of free riding problems the 
Chicago School perceive has been subject to sustained criticism. Popofsky cites the 
Chicagoan tendency to presume vertical restraints were correcting a free riding 
problem.154 Lao notes that the School tends to equate discounters with free riders.155 
Grimes reserves the sharpest criticism for Justice Scalia’s opinion in Sharp,156 stating 
‘Justice Scalia ignored record facts and a jury finding to justify a cutoff of a 
discounting dealer. Although there was virtually no evidence of free riding by the 
discounter, Scalia rated the defense as “holy writ”, not as a concept to be measured 
against the evidence.’157 
 
Justice Kennedy also equates discounters with free riders in Leegin.158 Low-service 
discounters can free ride on a high service distributor, ‘forcing it to cut back its services 
to a level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer’.159 However, Justice Breyer was 
sceptical about whether this is a problem with which antitrust policy should be 
concerned. He articulated his preferred mode of analysis as questioning ‘how often the 
“free riding” problem is serious enough significantly to deter dealer investment’.160 
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Lao broadens Breyer’s point slightly, observing that antitrust policy should not be 
concerned with free riding that deters dealer investment unless it deters investment that 
enhances consumer welfare.161 Assuming a consumer welfare objective, a critical 
consideration is to what extent vertical restraints ensure provision of, or cause 
overprovision of, services. Ensuring services enhances consumer welfare, but 
overprovision causes consumer detriment due to unnecessarily higher prices. Justice 
Kennedy attempts to justify minimum RPM in circumstances with no free riding 
problem, stating 
‘Resale price maintenance can also increase interbrand competition by encouraging 
retailer services that would not be provided even absent free riding. It may be difficult 
and inefficient for a manufacturer to make and enforce a contract with a retailer 
specifying the different services the retailer must perform. Offering the retailer a 
guaranteed margin and threatening termination if it does not live up to expectations 
may be the most efficient way to expand the manufacturer’s market share by inducing 
the retailer’s performance and allowing it to use its own initiative and experience in 
providing valuable services.’162 
 
However, arguments justifying the hardcore restrictions in the absence of a free riding 
problem are unconvincing. Valuable services will be provided by distributors because of 
consumer demand unless a genuine free riding problem renders them unviable. Steiner 
considers contractual mechanisms superior to vertical restraints for compelling dealers to 
provide valued services,163 while Bork dismisses contractual provisions as having 
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uneconomic enforcement costs for manufacturers.164 However, dealers subject to vertical 
restraints may choose to pocket the guaranteed margin rather than provide services,165 
and may only be compelled to provide services by a genuine threat of termination. To 
maintain such a threat, a manufacturer would also incur enforcement costs, and it is 
difficult to see why these would require less investment than contractual enforcement 
costs. 
 
Klein and Murphy, who generally are sympathetic to vertical restraints, express 
scepticism about whether they can ensure provision of services.166 They consider 
minimum RPM an ineffective way of preventing free riding and promoting services, 
because it is flawed economic analysis that assumes service provision is the only means 
by which dealers can improve their position while subject to it.167 They cite tying 
arrangements as an option for circumventing vertical restraints, and consider territorial 
restraints superior to price restraints to prevent dealers from ‘shirking’ on providing 
services.168 
 
The ‘quality certification’ justification also raised in Leegin similarly draws a distinction 
between nonprice and price restraints. Quality certification arose in the 1980s169 as an 
attempt to extend the ‘standard theory’ of the free-riding problem.170 The Bush 
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Administration submitted in Leegin that quality certification could justify minimum 
RPM, stating  
‘Prestige retailers have developed reputations for stocking only high quality or 
especially fashionable products, which may be costly for the retailers to identify. 
Many customers may evaluate products largely on the basis of the stocking choices 
made by the prestige retailers – an effect known as quality certification or signalling. 
Other retailers may seek to sell at a discount the same products stocked by prestige 
retailers, thereby free riding on the prestige retailers’ quality certifications. When 
quality certification is important to consumers, a manufacturer’s best strategy may be 
to impose RPM, which induces prestige retailers to carry its product when free riding 
otherwise would make it unprofitable to do so.’171 
 
The argument is fundamentally flawed. Consumer welfare is not promoted by restricting 
output to ‘quality certifying’ retailers if consumers are willing to buy from discounters. 
The very fact that consumers will buy a product from discounters undermines the case 
that the consumer considers quality certification of that product important at all. The 
European Commission frames quality certification as a free-rider problem, not a discrete 
consideration.172 The Commission considers that a nonprice restriction like exclusive 
distribution or selective distribution can be justified on quality certification grounds 
when it is ‘vital’ for the market penetration of a new product that they are only placed in 
‘quality certifying’ retailers.173 As such, quality certification is a limited justification for 
territorial restraints to promote market penetration, but a thoroughly unconvincing 
justification for minimum RPM. 
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Ultimately, sound analysis of the effect of vertical restraints must be based on a sound 
definition of the free rider problem. Observing the use of minimum RPM in markets 
with no plausible free rider problem,174 Lao advocated a structured rule of reason for 
minimum RPM; a ‘quick-look’ test for a material free riding problem, condemning any 
agreement where it is absent.175 As such, there is an inherent risk to a flawed definition 
of free riding. The presumption of free riding in Sharp176 risks permitting the 
entrenchment of services that do not promote consumer welfare, which causes consumer 
detriment by increasing final costs to the consumer. Comanor criticises the Chicago 
School for failing to properly assess differences in consumer preferences for level of 
service.177 He characterises this in terms of ‘marginal’ and inframarginal’ consumers, 
stating 
‘Economic theory alone cannot predict whether the imposition of vertical restraints – 
and dealers’ provision of additional services – will benefit consumers and enhance 
efficiency. Whether consumers benefit depends on whether gains to marginal 
consumers outweigh losses to their infra-marginal counterparts…Marginal consumers 
are likely to value information more highly than do infra-marginal buyers, who have 
generally used the product before or at least understand how to use it…As long as 
these relationships hold true, producers may induce distributors to supply an excessive 
level of information services.’178 
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Comanor’s position is consistent with the consensus that vertical restraints are most 
likely to be procompetitive when used to promote market penetration. A new product is 
vulnerable to free riding, when consumer demand for information will be at its 
highest.179 100% of consumers of new products are marginal, which will gradually 
reduce as the product becomes established. 
 
The US Government’s brief in Leegin rebuts that Comanor’s position justifies per se 
illegality for minimum RPM, and Comanor did not support either party in his own 
amicus brief in Leegin.180 The government contended that interbrand competition would 
correct any potential harm to inframarginal consumers.181 However, they add that 
‘higher prices may enhance consumer welfare as a whole because consumers effectively 
receive a different and better product at the higher price’.182 It is a flawed argument 
because vertical restraints have the potential to cause an overprovision of services. 
Higher prices resulting from services for which there is insufficient consumer demand 
cannot be said to increase consumer welfare.  
 
4.5. Antitrust policy on the forms of competition  
Antitrust policy is assessed in the context of its effect on two sets of forms of 
competition: (1) price competition and service competition; and (2) interbrand 
competition and intrabrand competition. A policy position on vertical agreements can be 
defined by the extent to which it is concerned with the restriction of one half of each pair 
for the purposes of stimulating the other. Leegin allows the elimination of intrabrand 
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price competition by minimum RPM to promote intrabrand service competition. Justice 
Kennedy states 
‘If the consumer can…buy the product from a retailer that discounts because it has 
not spent capital providing services or developing a quality reputation, the high-
service retailer will lose sales to the discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a 
level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer. Minimum resale price 
maintenance alleviates the problem because it prevents the discounter from 
undercutting the service provider. With price competition decreased, the 
manufacturer’s retailers compete among themselves over services.’183 
 
Kennedy’s position is problematic because it fails to deal with Comanor’s arguments on 
consumer preference. It adopts the Chicagoan assumption that the interests of 
manufacturer and consumer will always coincide when vertical restraints are used to 
promote efficiency.184 For instance, if there is a universal consumer preference for high-
service sales, there should not be a viable market for low-service discounters. In his 
Leegin dissent, Breyer articulates the potential adverse effects of agreements eliminating 
intrabrand price competition to promote intrabrand service competition thus 
‘they can prevent dealers from offering customers the lower prices that many 
customers prefer; they can prevent dealers from responding to changes in demand, 
say, falling demand, by cutting prices; they can encourage dealers to substitute 
service, for price, competition, thereby threatening wastefully to attract too many 
resources into that portion of the industry; they can inhibit expansion by more 
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efficient dealers whose lower prices might otherwise attract more customers, stifling 
the development of new, more efficient modes of retailing; and so forth.’185 
 
However, the majority rejected the respondent’s submission that lowering consumer 
prices should be the principal objective of US antitrust policy.186 Justice Kennedy stated 
the 
‘Respondent is mistaken in relying on pricing effects absent a further showing of 
anticompetitive conduct…for, as has been indicated already, the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect interbrand competition, from which lower prices can later 
result.’187 
 
The statement that ‘price competition is so important it can never be eliminated’188 
continues to define the EU’s contrasting position on price competition, and the 2010 
Guidelines articulate the negative effects of minimum RPM in this context.189 It 
incorporates both what Rey and Verge describe as the ‘price uniformity’ effect of 
eliminating intrabrand price competition,190 and the effects on distributive efficiency 
argued by Breyer in Leegin.191 The US and EU policies can be distinguished by their 
faith in interbrand competition to correct the adverse effects of eliminating intrabrand 
competition. Sylvania cemented the ‘unequivocal’ position of interbrand competition in 
US antitrust,192 as  
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‘the primary concern of antitrust law…The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly 
independent of the level of interbrand competition confronting the 
manufacturer…when interbrand competition exists, as it does among television 
manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market 
power’193  
 
Easterbrook states ‘inter- and intrabrand competition…are not commensurable’,194 and, 
in probably a clearer exposition of the Chicago School’s attitude, ‘Intrabrand 
competition as such is worthless’.195 It is a Chicagoan fundamental that antitrust policy 
should not be concerned with the protection of intrabrand competition. Consten and 
Grundig stated an equal concern for interbrand and intrabrand competition thus 
‘Although competition between producers is generally more noticeable than that 
between distributors of products of the same make, it does not thereby follow that an 
agreement tending to restrict the latter kind of competition should escape the 
prohibition of [Article 101 (1)] merely because it might increase the former.’196 
 
At that time, the Court rejected Advocate General Roemer’s justifications for the 
restriction of intrabrand competition to promote interbrand competition.197 Since the 
introduction of the ‘more economic approach’, however, EU competition policy has 
adopted a more nuanced position. The Easterbrook argument that the two levels of 
competition are ‘not commensurable’ has become unchallenged in EU competition 
policy. The 1996 Green Paper on vertical restraints concluded their ‘Anti-competitive 
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effects are only likely where interbrand competition is weak and there are barriers to 
entry.’198 
 
However, protection of intrabrand competition has not been disregarded by EU 
competition policy. The 2000 Guidelines stated ‘if there is insufficient inter-brand 
competition, the protection of inter- and intra-brand competition becomes important’.199 
While the 2000 Guidelines evidently prioritise interbrand over intrabrand competition, 
the 2010 Guidelines are more ambiguous, stating 
‘For most vertical restraints, competition concerns can only arise if there is 
insufficient competition at one or more levels of trade, that is, if there is some degree 
of market power at the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels.’200 
 
The Leegin majority stated ‘vertical nonprice restraints have impacts similar to those of 
vertical price restraints’.201 It is undeniable that the illegality distinction between the 
hardcore restrictions in the period from Sylvania and Leegin appeared contradictory, and 
Justice Kennedy considered it ‘an anachronistic distinction that finds no support in sound 
economic analysis’.202 Steiner, a critic of the Chicago School, concedes there is a case 
for identical treatment of the hardcore restrictions, but rejects it due to the dangers of 
permitting RPM under an antitrust policy which accepts the Chicagoan position on 
intrabrand competition.203  
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There is a clear distinction in the effect of the hardcore restrictions at the intrabrand 
level. ATP wholly eliminates intrabrand competition. Minimum RPM eliminated 
intrabrand price competition but does not directly restrict intrabrand competition for 
provision of services. However, the argument that both restrictions should be subject to 
the same rule of reason is based on a precarious Chicagoan assumption. The contention 
that the two levels of competition operate independently of each other, and that 
restrictions on intrabrand competition can never have the effect of restricting interbrand 
competition, is fundamentally flawed.   
 
4.6. Justifications of the US and EU hardcore restrictions policies 
Following White Motor, Comanor argued that vertical nonprice restraints could restrict 
interbrand competition by product differentiation,204 the process by which manufacturers 
attempt to create a unique market for their product. However, product differentiation is 
frequently a result of innovation, and as such cannot reasonably be considered 
anticompetitive per se. Comanor concedes this, stating 
‘While some measure of product differentiation may be desirable, even though price 
competition is lessened, the attainment of differentiation is not a valid reason for 
rejecting the normal presumption of antitrust policy in favour of maximum 
competitive behaviour on the part of independent firms.’205  
 
Fox argued for antitrust policy based ‘on an environment that is conducive to vigorous 
rivalry’.206 As such, antitrust policy based on the process objectives advocated by 
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Comanor and Fox would justify the per se illegality of ATP, assuming the objective of 
maximising competition was not limited solely to the interbrand level. 
 
Under an antitrust policy of consumer welfare, however, ATP can be justifiable in 
certain circumstances. Consumer welfare can be promoted by subjecting ATP to a rule 
of reason based on market power thresholds rooted in robust economic assumptions and 
a principled mode of defining relevant markets. The former should prevent oligopolistic 
abuse of distribution agreements for anticompetitive purposes; the latter should counter 
anticompetitive actions such as product differentiation.207 
 
The absolute prohibition of ATP under EU law is rooted in the EU’s market integration 
objective.208 The European Project not only had to merge national markets, but different 
economic traditions. There remains a strong risk of the EU developing ‘national affinity’ 
distribution oligopolies, where distributors monopolise national markets due to domestic 
familiarity rather than merit. ATP presents a serious tendency to isolate national markets 
and reinforce national affinity oligopolies. The EU’s market integration objective is 
ultimately a structural objective required to prevent market division, which logically 
justifies its absolute prohibition of ATP. 
 
While some consider ATP and minimum RPM broadly to have similar economic effects, 
much academic opinion considers the latter more anticompetitive.209 Einer Elhauge 
states 
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‘The differences in possible anticompetitive effects are various. Unlike vertical 
minimum price-fixing, vertical nonprice restraints don’t have a possible adverse effect 
on interbrand competition by impeding the ability of retailers to adjust prices in 
response to competition from other brands. Vertical limits on territories and customers 
also don’t facilitate oligopolistic coordination between manufacturers’210 
 
The Respondent in Leegin argued minimum RPM had a negative effect on consumer 
welfare by inhibiting dealer efficiency.211 The fundamental contention is that vigorous 
interbrand competition depends on price responsiveness. Minimum RPM tends to spread 
among competing manufacturers and entrenches oligopolistic market power.212 In such 
circumstances, no dealer has an incentive to reduce costs, or be any more innovative than 
the least efficient dealer among them because they will not be able to charge a lower 
price to encourage business.  
 
Ultimately, the Leegin decision is flawed because the circumstances in which minimum 
RPM can promote consumer welfare are too limited not to justify per se illegality. It can 
only be characterised as promoting consumer welfare when the analysis of its economic 
effect is based on flawed Chicagoan assumptions. The argument that restrictions on 
intrabrand price competition cannot affect interbrand competition are unconvincing. The 
judgment does not properly engage with Post-Chicagoan economics; despite the 
significant issues with the Kodak judgment,213 the fact that it is not mentioned in Leegin 
has allowed an unprincipled distinction to emerge between aftermarket effect and 
intrabrand effect on interbrand competition. The Court, therefore, failed to find a robust 
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economic justification for repealing the per se illegality of minimum RPM, as it does not 
promote consumer welfare except on Chicagoan assumptions. 
 
By contrast, the European Union’s position on minimum RPM is justified logically 
under most interpretations of its multivalued competition law objectives. In particular, it 
is clear that it is wholly inconsistent with the objectives of protecting effective 
competition and the competitive process, and that it has been so since the statements in 
Metro on the importance of price competition in 1977.214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
214 C-26/76 Metro 1905 
112 
 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1. Summary  
This thesis set out to ascertain the present competition policy objectives of the US and 
the EU, consider their political context and historical development, critique their 
underlying economic principles, and conclude whether their legal positions on the 
hardcore vertical restrictions were logically justified. 
 
The second chapter concluded that the prevailing present objective of US antitrust policy 
was the promotion of consumer welfare.1 The US federal courts have had authority to 
interpret the Sherman Act dynamically, and shifting political and economic imperatives 
have caused revolutions in antitrust policy. The antitrust laws were originally borne out 
of a period of industrial revolution and agricultural depression following the Civil War,2 
and the significant early case law focused on challenging railroad industry cartels.3 
Academics advocating a variety of antitrust policy objectives have scrutinised closely 
the early case law, from the 1890s to the 1920s, and each school of thought cites 
evidence supporting their positions.4 The Warren Court period, following the Second 
World War, was defined by a desire to promote small business welfare, and to prevent 
the economic concentrations which had facilitated totalitarianism in Europe.5 
 
However, cases preventing concentrations in critical heavy industries, such as Alcoa,6 
were followed by decisions to block mergers that could never have dominated markets,7 
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and problematic failures to comprehend the interplay between differing levels of 
competition.8 By the 1970s, Warren Court antitrust policy had become economically 
untenable in the eyes of the business community, and the forceful arguments of the 
Chicago School rapidly became the dominant force in US antitrust.9 Chicago’s sole 
antitrust policy objective was the promotion of consumer welfare, which they defined by 
the economic metrics of efficiency and restriction of output.  
 
However, the Chicago School is characterised by flawed and overly simplistic economic 
assumptions,10 and it began to lose favour following the end of the Reagan 
Administration. Case law departing from Chicago, principally Maricopa County and 
Kodak, generally failed to find a principled and comprehensive economic metric to 
replace Chicago.11 As such, the language of Chicago has been retained by US antitrust, 
and while Post-Chicagoans differ between themselves in modes of economic analysis, 
they largely have retained Chicagoan policy objectives. Thus, consumer welfare 
remains, essentially, the sole objective of US antitrust policy.12 
 
The third chapter concluded that EU competition policy has retained a multivalued set of 
objectives.13 It contrasts with US antitrust policy because it has incorporated multiple 
new policy objectives over time instead of replacing them. Antitrust came about in 
Europe as an imperative following the end of the Second World War.14 Germany’s late 
period of industrialisation and its imperial aspirations were factors that made it 
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particularly vulnerable to cartelisation,15 which ultimately facilitated the Nazis’ 
hegemonic economic power.16 The historical development of European competition 
policy has thus been linked inextricably to the European Project. Its initial policy 
objective was that of market integration, the principal policy objective of the ECSC as 
conceived by Schuman and Adenauer,17 which continued following the foundation of the 
EEC.  
 
The market integration objective is rooted in Ordoliberalism,18 the school of economics 
that defined postwar West German economic policy.19 It was articulated as the principal 
objective of European competition policy in the 1960s in the Consten and Grundig case 
on ATP.20 The DG Competition was first headed by the Ordoliberal Hans von der 
Groeben,21 but subsequent Commissioners introduced a ‘Keynesian discourse’,22 the 
influence of other economic schools of thought that led to the incorporation of the 
effective competition objective in the 1970s.23 While this discourse incorporated the 
industrial and social policy goals of the Community into its competition policy,24 the 
particular importance of upholding the competitive process was apparent in 1970s case 
law.25 
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22 S.M. Ramirez-Perez and S. van de Scheur ‘The Evolution of the Law on Articles 85 and 86 EEC [Article 101 
and 102 TFEU]: Ordoliberalism and its Keynesian Challenge’ in K.K. Patel and H. Schweitzer (editors) The 
Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (1st ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) 19, 30 – 31 
23 Chapter 3.4, pages 60 – 61 
24 Ibid, page 61 
25 See C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v Commission [1973] ECR 215 
and C-26/76 Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875 
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Finally, the EU’s more economic approach, introduced in the 1990s, relaxed its 
restrictions on vertical agreements and introduced consumer welfare and efficiency 
objectives into EU competition policy.26 However, the EU has not resolved the 
conflicting nature of its multiple objectives, with the process objectives of effective 
competition clashing with the consumer welfare objectives of the more economic 
approach.27 Notably, an attempt by the General Court to introduce further economic 
considerations into the construction of Article 101 (1) TFEU was reversed by the ECJ.28  
 
The fourth chapter considered the economic principles underlying adjudication of 
vertical restraints, in particular the free riding theory and its effect on provision of 
services,29 and the distinctions between the different forms of competition.30 While the 
Sylvania argument that vertical restraints can be justified to ensure provision of services 
are not prevented by free riding is sound,31 the Chicagoan tendency to attempt to stretch 
the scope of the free riding theory is apparent.32 This is evident in Scalia’s presumption 
of a free riding problem in Sharp,33 where he equates discounters with free riders; and in 
the fundamentally flawed quality certification theory.34 There is clear scepticism in the 
economic literature that vertical restraints are, in fact, always effective at ensuring 
appropriate provision of services.35 Comanor considers that Chicagoan interpretation of 
                                                          
26 Chapter 3.5, pages 65 – 68 
27 Ibid, page 74 
28 T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, reversed by C-501, 513, 
515 and 519/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291; see Chapter 3.5, pages 
69 – 71 
29 Chapter 4.4, pages 97 – 103 
30 Chapter 4.5, pages 103 – 108 
31 Chapter 4.4. page 97 
32 Ibid, pages 98 – 101 
33 Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corp 485 US 717 (1988), followed by Justice Kennedy in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products v PSKS 551 US 877 (2007) 890; see Chapter 4.4, page 98 
34 Chapter 4.4, pages 100 – 101 
35 Ibid, pages 99 – 100 
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vertical restraints can lead to an overprovision of services, causing higher prices and thus 
consumer detriment.36 
 
The fourth chapter concluded that the EU logically justifies its absolute prohibition of 
ATP and minimum RPM under its multifaceted set of policy objectives.37 Under its sole 
objective of consumer welfare, the US justifies its position on ATP,38 but has failed to 
provide a convincing justification for repealing the per se illegality of minimum RPM.39 
 
The US position on ATP follows the Northern Pacific standard for per se illegality.40 
ATP was ruled per se illegal in Schwinn without reference to Northern Pacific,41 and 
lower courts continually attempted to circumvent it42 until it was reversed in Sylvania.43 
Subject to a rule of reason based on market power thresholds with robust economic 
assumptions and principled definitions of relevant markets,44 ATP can be justifiable 
under a consumer welfare objective, as intrabrand territorial restrictions do not have the 
same adverse effect on interbrand competition as intrabrand price restrictions.45 
 
By contrast, the EU has consistently prohibited ATP since the Consten and Grundig 
judgment.46 In that case, the ECJ chose to structure its interpretation of Article 101 (1) 
                                                          
36 W.S. Comanor ‘Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the new Antitrust Policy’ (1985) 98 
(5) Harvard Law Review 983, 990; see Chapter 4.4, pages 102 – 103 
37 Chapter 4.6, pages 109 – 111  
38 Ibid, page 109 
39 Ibid, page 110-111 
40 Northern Pacific Railroad Co v United States 356 US 1 (1958); see Chapter 4.2, pages 77 – 78 
41 United States v Arnold, Schwinn and Co 388 US 365 (1967); see Chapter 4.2, pages 78 – 79 
42 See Adolph Coors Co v Federal Trade Commission 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Circuit, 1974), Tripoli Co v Wella 
Corp 425 F.2d 932 (3rd Circuit, 1970); see Chapter 4.2, pages 79 – 80 
43 Continental TV v GTE Sylvania 433 US 36 (1977); see Chapter 4.2, pages 80 – 83 
44 Chapter 4.6, page 109 
45 Ibid, pages 109 – 110, see E.R. Elhauge United States Antitrust Law and Economics (2nd ed. Foundation 
Press, New York, 2011) 444 
46 C-56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig 342 
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TFEU as requiring no economic assessment of agreements with ‘object’ status,47 despite 
Advocate General Roemer proposing the contrary.48 That has remained the case, and the 
market integration objective articulated in Consten and Grundig has been followed in 
many significant Commission and ECJ decisions on ATP since.49 As such, the market 
integration objective, critical to the success of the European project, continues to render 
the absolute prohibition of ATP imperative.50 
 
The EU’s absolute prohibition of minimum RPM has primarily been defined by the 
objective of protecting effective competition.51 The EU continues to follow the price 
competition statements made in the Metro case.52 As such, it is still classified as a 
hardcore restriction,53 despite criticism that its ‘object’ status is inconsistent with the 
more economic approach.54 However, it is apparent that the effects on both interbrand 
and intrabrand price competition of minimum RPM justify its absolute prohibition on the 
grounds of protecting effective competition.55 
 
The per se illegality of minimum RPM in US antitrust subsisted from the flawed Dr 
Miles case in 191156 until it was finally reversed by Leegin in 2007.57 However, the lack 
of an articulated, structured rule of reason in Leegin, which has been subject to 
                                                          
47 Ibid 
48 C-56 and 58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission (‘Consten and 
Grundig’) [1966] ECR 352 (Opinion of Advocate General Roemer) 358, with reference to White Motor Co v 
United States 372 US 253 (1963) 
49 Chapter 4.2, pages 84 – 85 
50 Chapter 4.6, page 109 
51 Chapter 4.3, pages 94 – 95 
52 C-26/76 Metro 1905 
53 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101 (3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices 
(2010) OJ L102/1 (23 April 2010) Article 4 (a); see Chapter 4.3, page 95 
54 Chapter 4.3, pages 95 – 96 
55 Chapter 4.6, page 111 
56 Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park & Sons Co 220 US 373 (1911), see Chapter 4.3, pages 86 – 87 
57 Leegin 551 US at 877, see Chapter 4.3, pages 90 – 93 
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significant criticism,58 ultimately means that the US has failed to justify the repeal of per 
se illegality for minimum RPM.59 US antitrust analysis is based on the precarious 
premise that interbrand competition operates wholly independently of intrabrand 
competition, and that interbrand competition should therefore be the sole form of 
competition with which antitrust is concerned.60 Leegin failed to engage with Post-
Chicagoan economics and justifies minimum RPM by reference to flawed Chicagoan 
assumptions,61 such as stretching the scope of the free riding theory. Minimum RPM can 
have significant effects on interbrand competition, including keeping final consumer 
prices artificially high across an entire market. Accordingly, the US should reconsider 
the Leegin decision, returning the per se illegality rule for minimum RPM; or failing 
that, put in place a properly structured rule of reason based on presumptive illegality for 
all but minimum RPM agreements for the purposes of market penetration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
58 Chapter 4.3, pages 93 – 94 
59 Chapter 4.6, pages 110 – 111 
60 Chapter 4.5, pages 105 – 106 
61 Chapter 4.6, pages 110 – 111 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts of Substantive Legislation 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 
Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three 
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
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Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market; all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control product, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contributes 
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which does not: 
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(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question. 
 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
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